CVE-2026-91113: CVE-2026-91113: Missing Authorization and Arbitrary Record Type Conversion in Silverstripe Framework…
CVE-2026-91113: Missing Authorization and Arbitrary Record Type Conversion in Silverstripe Framework GridFieldDetailForm Vulnerability ID: CVE-2026-91113 CVSS Score: 4.3 Published: 2026-11-16 A missing authorization
CVE-2026-91113: Missing Authorization and Arbitrary Record Type Conversion in Silverstripe Framework GridFieldDetailForm
Vulnerability ID: CVE-2026-91113
CVSS Score: 4.3
Published: 2026-11-16
A missing authorization and type validation vulnerability in Silverstripe Framework prior to version 6.2.13 allows authenticated CMS users to convert database records into arbitrary DataObject classes via user-controlled ClassName parameters in GridField detail forms.
TL;DR
Authenticated CMS users with edit access to any GridField record can submit a custom ClassName value in HTTP POST requests to morph the record into an unrelated or restricted DataObject class, bypassing both model hierarchy restrictions and target class permission checks (canCreate and canEdit).
Technical Details
- CVE ID: CVE-2026-91113 (GHSA-4qv2-g5vp-wjjw)
- Weakness Class: CWE-862: Missing Authorization
- CVSS v3.1 Score: 4.3 Medium (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N)
- Affected Component: GridFieldDetailForm_ItemRequest::saveFormIntoRecord()
- Affected Versions: silverstripe/framework < 6.2.13
- Patched Version: silverstripe/framework 6.2.13
- Exploit Status: No known public exploits or KEV listing
Affected Systems
- silverstripe/framework
- silverstripe/cms
-
silverstripe/framework: < 6.2.13 (Fixed in:
6.2.13)
Code Analysis
Commit: 8b6e9c4
Validate ClassName hierarchy and enforce canCreate/canEdit permissions in GridFieldDetailForm_ItemRequest::saveFormIntoRecord()
File: src/Forms/GridField/GridFieldDetailForm_ItemRequest.php
@@ -826,12 +826,40 @@ protected function saveFormIntoRecord($data, $form)
// Check object matches the correct classname
if (isset($data['ClassName']) && $data['ClassName'] != $this->record->ClassName) {
$newClassName = $data['ClassName'];
+ // The ClassName is read straight from request data, so it must be validated before
+ // it is honoured. Only allow conversion to a class within the list's own hierarchy,
+ // otherwise an attacker could inject an arbitrary DataObject subclass and induce
+ // type confusion or create a record of a type outside the GridField's intended scope.
+ if (!is_a($newClassName, $list->dataClass(), true)) {
+ $this->httpError(403, _t(
+ __CLASS__ . '.ClassNameNotAllowed',
+ 'Cannot change record type to "{ClassName}"',
+ ['ClassName' => $newClassName]
+ ));
+ return null;
+ }
// The records originally saved attribute was overwritten by $form->saveInto($record) before.
// This is necessary for newClassInstance() to work as expected, and trigger change detection
// on the ClassName attribute
$this->record->setClassName($this->record->ClassName);
// Replace $record with a new instance
$this->record = $this->record->newClassInstance($newClassName);
+ // A ClassName change both creates a record of the new type and writes the form data into it,
+ // so it requires create and edit authorisation on the new class. The only permission check in
+ // doSave() ran against the original class, before the conversion, so it does not cover the new
+ // type - without this an editor could convert a record into a type they cannot create.
+ $canConvert = $this->record->hasMethod('canCreate')
+ && $this->record->canCreate(null, $this->getCreateContext())
+ && $this->record->hasMethod('canEdit')
+ && $this->record->canEdit();
+ if (!$canConvert) {
+ $this->httpError(403, _t(
+ __CLASS__ . '.ClassNamePermissionFailure',
+ 'It seems you don\'t have the necessary permissions to save "{ObjectTitle}" as "{ClassName}"',
+ ['ObjectTitle' => $this->getModelName(), 'ClassName' => $newClassName]
+ ));
+ return null;
+ }
}
// Save form and any extra saved data into this record.
Mitigation Strategies
- Upgrade silverstripe/framework to version 6.2.13 or later to enforce model hierarchy validation and target class permission checks.
- Deploy WAF inspection rules on CMS administrative endpoints (/admin/*) to monitor or restrict unexpected ClassName parameters in POST bodies targeting ItemEditForm.
- Implement defensive checks within DataObject::onBeforeWrite() on sensitive models to reject unauthorized mutations to the ClassName property.
Remediation Steps:
- Audit Composer lockfiles (composer.lock) across all environments to identify installations of silverstripe/framework prior to 6.2.13.
- Run 'composer update silverstripe/framework' to upgrade to version 6.2.13 or higher.
- Flush the Silverstripe manifest cache post-deployment by running 'vendor/bin/sake dev/build flush=all'.
- Audit database tables managed by GridField components for anomalous or corrupted values in the ClassName column.
References
- GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-4qv2-g5vp-wjjw
- NVD Vulnerability Record for CVE-2026-91113
- CVE.org Official Record: CVE-2026-91113
- Silverstripe Framework Fix Pull Request #12042
- Fix Commit 8b6e9c4514cbe37feeaf9ddddf796a3109448187
- Silverstripe Framework Release 6.2.13
- Vendor Security Advisory Announcement (Silverstripe.org)
- FriendsOfPHP Security Advisory Record
Read the full report for CVE-2026-91113 on our website for more details including interactive diagrams and full exploit analysis.
Originally published by Dev.to Security. Aggregated on AIWithGhost for educational purposes — full credit and traffic to the original publisher.