Dev.to Security 🔐 Cybersecurity 👁 0 📖 2 min read

Zero-Dependency Prompt Injection & LLM Tool-Call Defense in Python

Autonomous AI agents that browse web pages, read GitHub issues, or inspect email are exposed to indirect prompt injection on every turn. When untrusted text enters the context window, a malicious string like <system>Igno

Autonomous AI agents that browse web pages, read GitHub issues, or inspect email are exposed to indirect prompt injection on every turn. When untrusted text enters the context window, a malicious string like <system>Ignore previous instructions...</system> or a leaked canary can hijack tool calls.

Here is a clean, zero-dependency Python pattern you can drop in front of any tool output before passing it back to your LLM loop.

1. Pattern + Canary Token Filter (agent_guard.py)

import re
from typing import Tuple, List

INJECTION_PATTERNS = [
    r"(?i)ignore\s+(all\s+)?(previous|prior|above)\s+instructions",
    r"(?i)system\s+prompt\s*:\s*you\s+are\s+now",
    r"(?i)disregard\s+(the\s+)?(developer|system)\s+instructions",
    r"(?i)new\s+operating\s+mode\s*:\s*jailbreak",
    r"(?i)output\s+(your\s+)?(system\s+instructions|hidden\s+prompt|secret\s+keys)",
    r"(?i)<\s*system\s*>",
    r"(?i)dan\s+mode|developer\s+mode\s+enabled",
    r"(?i)you\s+must\s+now\s+act\s+as\s+an\s+unrestricted",
]

class PromptDefenseFilter:
    def __init__(self, canary_token: str = None):
        self.canary = canary_token
        self.regexes = [re.compile(p) for p in INJECTION_PATTERNS]

    def scan_untrusted_input(self, text: str) -> Tuple[bool, List[str]]:
        flagged = []
        for r in self.regexes:
            if r.search(text):
                flagged.append(f"Pattern violation: {r.pattern}")

        if self.canary and self.canary in text:
            flagged.append("Canary token leak detected in untrusted content!")

        return len(flagged) == 0, flagged

    def sanitize(self, text: str) -> str:
        text = text.replace("<system>", "[system-tag-stripped]")
        text = text.replace("</system>", "[/system-tag-stripped]")
        text = text.replace("```

prompt", "

```text")
        return text

2. Why Canary Tokens Matter

Regex alone misses novel phrasing. Placing a unique non-guessable canary string in sensitive internal context and scanning outbound tool arguments/web responses catches prompt exfiltration immediately before external network calls execute.

3. Open-Source Lite Repo & Full Production Toolkits

Built with zero external dependencies so you can audit every line before deploying.

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