Your AI coding agent will commit your .env unless you stop it — I built the gate
Every AI coding agent I've used — Claude Code, Cursor, Copilot, Windsurf, Devin — will eventually try something you don't want. Commit a .env. Run rm -rf. Hallucinate a deprecated API. Burn your API budget in a loop. Th
Every AI coding agent I've used — Claude Code, Cursor, Copilot, Windsurf, Devin — will eventually try something you don't want. Commit a .env. Run rm -rf. Hallucinate a deprecated API. Burn your API budget in a loop.
The guardrails I've seen are suggestions in a system prompt. "Please don't do that." Models are really good at ignoring suggestions.
So I built aiZee: a local control plane that sits between you and the agent and enforces policy on the actual action path. Not advice — a wall.
The demo
aizee check 'Bash' --args '{"command":"git add .env && git commit -m keys"}' returns:
{
"ok": false,
"decision": "deny",
"reason": "guardian: commits secrets file .env"
}
That denial is not a warning the model can talk itself out of. It happens before the tool executes.
How it works
Every tool call, LLM request, memory write, and file change flows through one kernel pipeline:
Probity → Guardian → Policy → LoopDetector → Budget → Audit
- Probity — integrity verification of the runtime itself
- Guardian — pre-action checks (secret commits, destructive commands)
-
Policy — YAML rules with
allow / ask / deny / modify / observeverdicts.modifyrewrites a payload (audited),observelogs without blocking — verdicts beyond the usual allow/deny/ask - LoopDetector — blocks repeated tool-call loops before they burn budget
- Budget — token/cost/call limits per session, hour, day, week, month — and per PR in CI
- Audit — append-only, SHA-256 hash-chained, Ed25519-signed trail
On top of that: prompt-injection detection on inbound content (regex + embeddings + optional LLM judge), secret-leak checks on outbound responses, and an MCP firewall + gateway wrapping every external tool call.
It's not just a gate — it's an agent OS
The governance layer sits on top of a full environment:
-
245 skills with hash-locked integrity (
skills-lock.jsondetects any tampering) - 29 auto-detected personas — keyword scoring in English and Arabic, multi-persona composition, lifecycle-aware routing that reads your active BMAD initiative and biases selection to the current phase
- BMAD-METHOD vendored — the full agile-ai lifecycle (analyst → PM → architect → dev → PO) with ticket trees
- Hybrid memory — SQLite + FTS5 + optional vectors, bi-temporal queries, HMAC integrity
- MCP server — 46 tools, plus a governed LLM proxy with failover
- Dashboard — dark-first command center (Python stdlib, no Node required)
The numbers
- 7,656 tests, strict mypy on 223 source files, ruff clean
- 99.5% coverage on the governed surface
- 1,244 files integrity-validated, 0 errors
- MIT licensed
Try it
pip install aizee
aizee bootstrap --target ~/.aizee # materializes the full OS root from the wheel
aizee doctor # 46-check health verdict
The bootstrap extracts 1,900 files — skills, workflows, tech-stack references, policies, scripts — so pip install alone gives you a full-capability install, not a hollow shell. External tools (CLI utilities, media kits, docker images) are declared in deps.yaml and provisioned with aizee deps check|install.
Why I built it
AI agents are becoming the primary way code gets written. They are also the least governed layer in the stack — no audit trail, no budget enforcement, no policy engine. Prompt-level guardrails don't survive contact with a determined (or just confused) model.
aiZee treats agent actions like production infrastructure: every action passes a gate, every gate decision is logged, every log entry is signed.
Repo: https://github.com/m3taz-ahmed/aizee — demo GIF in the README shows the guardian denying a secret commit mid-flight.
I'd love feedback on the policy model — especially the modify/observe verdicts, which go beyond allow/deny/ask. What verdict types do you think we're missing?
Originally published by Dev.to AI. Aggregated on AIWithGhost for educational purposes — full credit and traffic to the original publisher.