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Writing Sigma rules that don't false-positive: the detection-engineering loop I packaged

Sigma rules are easy to write and hard to trust. A rule that fires on every legitimate login is worse than no rule — it trains your team to ignore alerts. Here's the detection-engineering loop I use, packaged into a $23

Sigma rules are easy to write and hard to trust. A rule that fires on every legitimate login is worse than no rule — it trains your team to ignore alerts. Here's the detection-engineering loop I use, packaged into a $23 sigma-rules kit with 40 rules across six ATT&CK tactics.

The loop: hypothesis → rule → test → tune → deploy

1. Start from the adversary's behavior, not the log source. Don't write "detect suspicious PowerShell" — write "detect PowerShell downloading from pastebin" (T1059.001 + T1105). ATT&CK technique first, log source second.

2. Write the rule against a real log sample. Every rule ships with the exact log line it should match. If you can't produce a sample, you don't understand the telemetry yet.

3. Test against BOTH sides. Run the rule against:

  • Known-bad data (attack simulation, red-team log, or documented malware behavior)
  • Known-good data (your actual environment's logs for a week)

A rule that only tested against bad data is a guessing game.

4. Tune for precision before recall. It's better to miss 10% of attacks with zero false positives than catch 100% with 50 FPs/day. Add filters: exclude service accounts, known admin workstations, maintenance windows.

5. Version and review. Sigma rules decay — log schemas change, attackers adapt. Quarterly review: is this rule still firing correctly? Still relevant?

What makes a rule production-ready

  • Specific, not generic: Image|endswith: '\powershell.exe' + suspicious command-line patterns beats powershell alone every time
  • Documented ATT&CK mapping: each rule cites its technique ID so coverage gaps are visible
  • False-positive notes: what legitimate activity might trigger this, and how to exclude it
  • Severity + confidence split: a high-confidence low-severity rule routes differently than low-confidence critical

The honest scope note

Sigma rules detect what your logs capture. If you're not shipping the right telemetry (process creation with command lines, DNS queries, auth failures), the best rules in the world see nothing. Detection engineering is 20% rule-writing, 80% telemetry quality.

The kit — 40 rules across credential-access, execution, persistence, exfiltration, lateral-movement, and discovery tactics, plus the tuning methodology — is in the store:

Store (pay in BTC, no account, instant download): https://dev.to/nexusfoundry/nexus-store-live-link (auto-updated current store URL)

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