Two new x402 APIs for AI agents: WAF/CDN fingerprint detector + per-cookie security-flags deep audit (2026-09-30)
Two new paid x402 endpoints just shipped for AI-agent web intelligence — both at $0.0005 USDC per call on Base mainnet. /api/waf-detect — WAF/CDN/edge-security fingerprint detector A 28-vendor catalog (Cloudf
Two new paid x402 endpoints just shipped for AI-agent web intelligence — both at $0.0005 USDC per call on Base mainnet.
/api/waf-detect — WAF/CDN/edge-security fingerprint detector
A 28-vendor catalog (Cloudflare / Fastly / Akamai / Imperva / Sucuri / AWS CloudFront + ALB / Azure Front Door / Vercel / Netlify / StackPath / KeyCDN / BunnyCDN / F5-BIGIP / Barracuda / Citrix NetScaler / ModSecurity / Wordfence / Shape Security / Kasada / PerimeterX / DataDome / etc) plus a malformed-payload probe that actually triggers the WAF when one is present.
How it works:
- Baseline request to scan response headers + body for vendor-specific markers
- Malformed payload probe — appends a SQLi + path-traversal query string; if the response diverges (status 403/406/429/503/418 OR vendor body marker appears), a WAF is present
- Scoring — primary vendor + confidence (high/medium/low/none) + is_waf + is_cdn + 0-100 A-F grade
Real results:
-
cloudflare.com→ cloudflare primary, confidence high, score 95/A — payload probe blocked at 403, CF-RAY + cf-cache-status detected -
github.com→ github-pages primary, confidence low, score 58/D —Server: GitHub.comheader match, no WAF -
wordpress.com→ unattributed, score 60/C — payload probe blocked at 406 with no vendor marker (likely custom rule) -
stripe.com→ no detection, score 30/F — direct origin, no edge layer
/api/cookie-samesite — per-cookie security-flags deep audit
Goes deeper than the existing /api/cookie-flags (presence/parseability) and /api/cookie-consent (CMP/UX). Parses every Set-Cookie individually for:
- SameSite — Strict / Lax / None / missing / Lax-by-default (Chrome 80+ heuristic)
- Secure + HttpOnly — modern browser requirements
-
Path + Domain — leading-dot broad-domain detection (
.example.comexposes subdomains) - Max-Age + Expires — session-cookie detection (no expiry = CSRF vector for long-lived sessions)
- __Host- + __Secure- prefix validation (RFC 6265bis) — __Host- MUST have Secure + Path=/ + NO Domain; __Secure- MUST have Secure
- SameParty + Partitioned (CHIPS spec)
Risk flags surfaced:
-
samesite_none_without_secure— rejected by modern browsers -
session_token_no_httponly— auth cookies exposed to XSS -
prefix_violation— wrong-prefix cookie names that browsers won't honor -
broad_domain_cookies— leading-dot Domain attribute exposing subdomains -
session_cookie_no_expires— session cookies without expiry (CSRF risk)
Real results:
-
github.com→ 1 cookie_gh_sess: SameSite=Lax, Secure, HttpOnly, broad-domain on.github.com, score 100/A (with broad_domain flag) -
anthropic.com→ 1 cookie_cfuvid: SameSite=None (Cloudflare bot mgmt), Secure, HttpOnly, session=true, score 100/A -
stripe.com→ 1 cookiecid: SameSite=Lax, Secure, score 100/A
Why these matter for AI agents
When an AI agent fetches a site for ingestion, summarization, or interaction:
- WAF detection tells the agent whether the page is trustworthy — vendor-controlled edge layers (Cloudflare/Akamai) are common, and a malformed response usually means the WAF blocked the agent's request
- Cookie security tells the agent whether session-management is CSRF-vulnerable (SameSite missing) or XSS-vulnerable (HttpOnly missing) — critical for agents that interact with authenticated flows
Both endpoints are 402-gated via x402 with the standard envelope (payTo 0xCa0a6c...c, USDC on Base, 500 atomic = $0.0005 per call). 1 free /api endpoint still available for unauthenticated basic extraction.
Full catalog: 82 paid endpoints live at /.well-known/x402. OpenAPI spec at /openapi.json. llms.txt for AI-agent discovery.
Originally published by Dev.to Security. Aggregated on AIWithGhost for educational purposes — full credit and traffic to the original publisher.