Dev.to Security 🔐 Cybersecurity 👁 0 📖 2 min read

Shipping an LLM feature? The 15 intake questions that catch injection, exfil, and agency risks before code review

Every "AI feature" PR I've reviewed has the same shape: the demo works, the evals pass, and nobody asked the questions that matter at 2 AM when it goes wrong. Prompt injection isn't a model problem — it's an architecture

Every "AI feature" PR I've reviewed has the same shape: the demo works, the evals pass, and nobody asked the questions that matter at 2 AM when it goes wrong. Prompt injection isn't a model problem — it's an architecture problem, and architecture questions get answered at intake, not after launch.

Here's the compressed checklist I use. It's deliberately boring — no scanner, no ML, just questions a human must answer in writing before the feature ships.

Data (questions 1-4)

  1. What data does the feature send to the model/provider? PII, secrets, customer data, code?
  2. Where does it go — which providers, regions, subprocessors?
  3. Is any of it used for training? Is opt-out configured?
  4. What's the retention/deletion path for prompts, outputs, embeddings?

Agency (5-7)

  1. Can the feature take actions — send, delete, spend, post? List every one.
  2. What gates each action? User consent, role, confirmation step?
  3. Can attacker-controlled content (tickets, web pages, docs) reach the model and induce tool calls outside scope?

Output (8-10)

  1. Where do outputs render — web, email, Slack, PDF? Is output treated as untrusted?
  2. Can outputs carry links/code/instructions that execute downstream?
  3. Are outputs logged, and who can read them?

Operations (11-15)

  1. Rate limits / spend caps? What's the cost-abuse ceiling?
  2. Fallback when the model is down or returns garbage?
  3. What signals page a human — injection attempts, exfil patterns, cost spikes?
  4. Incident path: who gets paged, what's pulled first?
  5. Kill switch: can you disable the feature without a deploy?

Scoring it

Each identified risk gets Likelihood × Impact (1-5 each). ≥12 high, 6-11 medium, ≤5 low. Three adjustments that matter more than the math:

  • +1 Likelihood if the feature ingests untrusted external content (almost all of them do)
  • +1 Impact if any action is irreversible (payments, deletes, customer-facing email)
  • Any risk touching credentials is minimum medium — no score overrides that

I packaged this as a full markdown pack — the checklist above, a pen-test case list, a risk matrix with the scoring rules, Jira-ready user stories for engineering, and a filled example — plus a small stdlib-only CLI that turns your intake JSON into HIGH/MEDIUM/LOW scores with a --fail-on-high CI gate.

AI Feature Security Intake Pack — $49: https://demand-dedicated-usc-hydrocodone.trycloudflare.com/p/ai-feature-security-intake

No scanner, no false promise of automation — it's the doc layer under your security review, which is the layer that actually catches "the demo worked" risk.

Still $0 revenue, ~45 articles in. Publishing the numbers because the funnel experiment is the story now: free samplers for top-of-funnel, paid packs for the convinced.

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