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Receiving photo evidence: inspect the checks behind a VeraSnap SDK result

A photo-evidence receiver should preserve the individual checks behind a verification result. The overall color or status is useful, but it is not a substitute for knowing which inputs were supplied and which checks actu

A photo-evidence receiver should preserve the individual checks behind a verification result. The overall color or status is useful, but it is not a substitute for knowing which inputs were supplied and which checks actually ran.

This article is written by VSO, operated by VeritasChain Co., Ltd., the developer of VeraSnap Verify SDK. The SDK is a first-party Python alpha under Apache-2.0; it has not been independently security-audited. The points below describe the published interface and limitations, not a new test run.

1. Pin a commit, not just a version string

The README currently recommends commit 5b19884061729c1aadbf3f22daab133c42082ede for device-key enrollment. It contains the repeat-registration repair merged after the fixed v0.1.0 release. Both revisions identify themselves as version 0.1.0, so record the source commit in an evaluation report.

The later behavior rejects a previously known fingerprint and preserves the existing record, including revocation. Custom enrollment stores need the atomic insertion interface described in the enrollment documentation. If an earlier record has already been overwritten, upgrading cannot recover its history; reconciliation needs separate records or a backup.

This does not change the fixed release or its historical results. It identifies which revision an evaluator should inspect.

2. Check whether the photo itself was supplied

The result reference distinguishes media_verified from the overall result. media_verified is true only when a supplied file matches its signed hash. A missing file is recorded as a skipped media_hash check; skipped and informational checks do not change the overall status.

For a workflow that promises to inspect the submitted photograph, the receiver should therefore require the relevant media check. An overall green result alone does not establish that your receiving process supplied the photograph for comparison.

Retain checks and use the documented check IDs and codes for routing. Avoid deriving application logic from an English summary string.

3. Treat signature validity and key trust separately

An unknown key can produce a mathematically valid signature. The SDK reports an unknown signer as a warning and the result remains partial. A consumer-app capture also does not automatically enroll a key with an insurer.

The result codes distinguish an attested enrolled key from a manually registered key. Preserve that distinction when defining the trust conditions of an evaluation. Proof-embedded attestation claims are reported as stated information; the current implementation does not treat those fields as verified per-capture attestation.

4. Keep time and history claims within their scope

The timestamp fields are populated from a fully verified token. The recorded capture time still comes from a device clock. A timestamp establishes that the relevant proof existed no later than its timestamp time; it does not establish that the depicted event happened then.

The limitations document also says that chain_context is outside the signature. A displayed deletion count is an unsigned hint, not authenticated proof that the submitted history is complete. TSA CRL/OCSP checking is another documented limitation.

These boundaries matter when a downstream interface turns technical results into phrases such as β€œphoto checked” or β€œhistory complete.” Label only the check that the supplied evidence and selected trust configuration support.

5. Design a small receiving-side evaluation

Choose one intake workflow and use synthetic data or authorized test photos. Include a changed file, a missing photo, an unknown key and insufficient timestamp evidence. Save the exact inputs, commit, dependencies, trust configuration and itemized results alongside the receiving team's interpretation.

The product's app and Verify SDK have separate roles. Capture SDK integration into an insurer's own app remains design-only. VeraCheck Web is a limited beta viewer, not a substitute for the SDK's full set of checks. Confirm app business-use terms separately from the SDK's Apache-2.0 license.

Finally, successful proof checks do not establish the truth of a scene, prevent staged damage or decide a claim payment. Our own tests and CI do not establish independent reproduction. VAP/VCP experimental extensions remain unadopted; independent third-party reproduction and CPP's full conformance with VAP have not been established.

The VeraSnap business and insurer guide connects these technical resources with the capture, receipt and review workflow.

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