Prove Moodle dataroot is not on the public hostname
A Moodle™ install that looks healthy on /login/index.php can still be serving student submissions, session files and backup zips from a directory the browser can reach. The directory is $CFG->dataroot. Moodle stores uplo
A Moodle™ install that looks healthy on /login/index.php can still be serving student submissions, session files and backup zips from a directory the browser can reach. The directory is $CFG->dataroot. Moodle stores uploaded files there on purpose. The web server is not supposed to.
The official check is Site administration → Reports → Security checks. That report is a start. It is not proof. The proof is a request from the public hostname that either 404s or is refused, against a file you know exists on disk.
What dataroot actually holds
On a typical production host:
/var/moodledata/filedir/ # hashed copies of every uploaded file
/var/moodledata/sessions/ # PHP session files if you still use file sessions
/var/moodledata/temp/ # backups, imports, unzip leftovers
/var/moodledata/cache/ # MUC file store
/var/moodledata/localcache/
/var/moodledata/trashdir/
If that tree sits under the document root — public_html/moodledata, www/data, htdocs/moodledata — a guessable path plus directory listing, or a known hash, bypasses every capability check Moodle runs in pluginfile.php. The file is just a static object. No sesskey. No login.
Moodle 5.1 moved most of the code into a public/ subdirectory and asks you to point Apache DocumentRoot or nginx root at that folder (restructure notes). That change does not move dataroot. Dataroot is still $CFG->dataroot in config.php. A 5.1 upgrade that only flips the document root can leave a 4.x moodledata folder sitting next to public/ and still reachable if the vhost was not tightened.
Find the path, then try to fetch it
On the server:
php -r 'define("CLI_SCRIPT", true); require "config.php"; echo $CFG->dataroot, PHP_EOL, $CFG->dirroot, PHP_EOL, $CFG->wwwroot, PHP_EOL;'
On Moodle 5.1 you also have $CFG->root (the install root, parent of public/). Compare three things:
- Document root of the vhost (
grep -R "root \|DocumentRoot" /etc/nginx /etc/apache2). -
$CFG->dataroot. - Whether (2) is a child of (1).
If dataroot is /var/www/moodle/moodledata and the vhost root is /var/www/moodle or /var/www/moodle/public, stop. Move it.
Place a canary the web server would serve if the tree were public:
CANARY="$CFG_DATAROOT/web-canary-$(date +%Y%m%d).txt"
# run as the deploy user who can write dataroot
echo "not-a-public-file" > /var/moodledata/web-canary-$(date +%Y%m%d).txt
chmod 600 /var/moodledata/web-canary-$(date +%Y%m%d).txt
From a laptop that is not on the campus VPN allow-list:
HOST=lms.example.org
# Common leftover names. Every 200 here is an incident.
for p in \
/moodledata/ \
/data/ \
/moodledata/filedir/ \
/moodledata/web-canary-$(date +%Y%m%d).txt \
/filedir/ \
/public/../moodledata/ \
; do
echo "=== $p ==="
curl -sI "https://$HOST$p" | grep -iE 'HTTP/|location:|content-type|x-content-type'
done
What you want: 404 from Moodle’s theme, or a 403 from the edge that does not list the directory. What you do not want: 200 with text/html (listing), 200 with text/plain (the canary), or a 301 into a path that then 200s.
Path traversal in the URL (/public/../moodledata/) is the upgrade-specific case. nginx alias plus a missing trailing slash, or Apache Alias /moodle /srv/moodle/public without a matching directory block, will serve the parent. The 5.1 restructure makes that class of bug more likely, not less, because people copy a new root line and leave an old alias.
Do not trust a 403 from the app
A 403 from PHP means Moodle’s router saw the request. That is already too far. Dataroot should never hit PHP. The edge should not map that URL to a file.
Also test the raw object store layout:
# Moodle hashes uploads as filedir/ab/cd/<contenthash>
curl -sI "https://lms.example.org/moodledata/filedir/"
curl -sI "https://lms.example.org/data/filedir/"
If either is 200 or 403-with-body, an attacker with one contenthash (from an HTML export, an email, a backup) fetches the file without a Moodle session.
Move it without breaking pluginfile.php
Moodle serves those files through pluginfile.php and draftfile.php on purpose. Those scripts look at $CFG->dataroot on disk. The public URL never contains the filesystem path.
# downtime window. Drain php-fpm workers first.
sudo systemctl stop php8.3-fpm
sudo mv /var/www/moodle/moodledata /var/moodledata
# config.php
# $CFG->dataroot = '/var/moodledata';
sudo chown -R www-data:www-data /var/moodledata
sudo find /var/moodledata -type d -exec chmod 700 {} \;
sudo find /var/moodledata -type f -exec chmod 600 {} \;
sudo systemctl start php8.3-fpm
Then:
curl -sI "https://lms.example.org/moodledata/" | head -n 1
# fetch a known course file the way a student would, via pluginfile.php, while logged in
Site administration → Reports → Security checks should stop complaining about dataroot. Re-run the canary curls from outside. Delete the canary.
On nginx, keep dataroot off every location. Do not alias /moodledata. Do not try_files into $CFG->dataroot.
Moodle 5.1: two roots, one mistake
After 5.1:
| Variable | Typical value | Browser-visible |
|---|---|---|
$CFG->root |
/srv/moodle |
no, if document root is public/
|
$CFG->dirroot |
/srv/moodle/public |
yes |
$CFG->dataroot |
/var/moodledata |
no |
$CFG->wwwroot |
https://lms.example.org |
yes |
A host that sets root /srv/moodle; instead of root /srv/moodle/public; publishes config.php, vendor/, and anything you parked next to the project — including dataroot if you put it there “to keep the backup simple”.
curl -sI https://lms.example.org/config.php
curl -sI https://lms.example.org/vendor/autoload.php
curl -sI https://lms.example.org/composer.json
config.php 200 is a different incident from dataroot 200. Both are “the document root is too high”. Fix the vhost, then prove dataroot again. The security-checks report will mention public/private paths; the curls are what you keep in the change ticket.
I built GuardLMS to watch Moodle hosts for this class of exposure between pentests. Disclosure: I am the founder. The canary file and the curls above are still the check you run once, on staging, before any monitor is useful.
Originally published by Dev.to Security. Aggregated on AIWithGhost for educational purposes — full credit and traffic to the original publisher.