Ping64|The Second Laptop My Coworker Uses for Weekend Side Jobs Ended Up on Our Internal Network
Last month I was scrolling through DHCP leases on a quiet Friday afternoon, mostly to avoid my inbox, when a hostname caught my eye. It belonged to a laptop nobody on the IT side had ever imaged or enrolled. Ten minutes
Last month I was scrolling through DHCP leases on a quiet Friday afternoon, mostly to avoid my inbox, when a hostname caught my eye. It belonged to a laptop nobody on the IT side had ever imaged or enrolled. Ten minutes of casual detective work later, I learned it was the second machine of a developer who does freelance web work on weekends. The hostname even matched his side projectโs name, which made the whole thing feel oddly innocent.
He wasnโt hiding it, either. When I asked, he just said the guest Wi-Fi kept dropping during video calls, so he plugged into the office port with a cable. Nobody had told him that personal machines shouldnโt touch the internal network, and frankly, I couldnโt point him to a document that actually said so. He assumed the wired port was simply the reliable version of the wireless one, which is a fair reading of the setup.
The mundane details that bothered me
The laptop had no endpoint agent and no disk encryption I could verify. Its browser was full of logins for freelance clients, personal email, and a couple of shopping sites. And because it sat on a wired port, it had landed in a subnet that can reach our file servers.
Iโve noticed this pattern several times over the years, and it rarely looks scary in the logs. The machine doesnโt scan anything, doesnโt move laterally, doesnโt trip a single rule. It just sits there, quietly reachable, waiting for some other problem to make it relevant. In one earlier job, a similar machine sat unnoticed for so long that people started treating it as a shared resource and printing to it.
Why nobody caught it earlier
Our device inventory focuses on managed endpoints, and this laptop wasnโt one. Our Wi-Fi portal catches unknown devices on wireless, but the wired ports were a gap nobody had revisited since before the office renovation. Gaps like that never announce themselves; they just wait for someone curious enough to look.
I donโt think this happened because anyone made a bad decision. It happened because of a chain of small, reasonable ones. The guest network was slow, the cable was right there, and connecting directly was the path of least resistance. Most shadow devices in most companies arrive exactly this way, one convenient shortcut at a time. Nobody breaks in; the door is simply open and nobody remembers who left it that way.
Iโve also seen unified platforms such as Ping64 used to cut down the overhead of juggling many separate security tools. When device visibility lives in fewer places, an unfamiliar machine tends to stand out sooner instead of hiding between dashboards. Thatโs been my experience in the environments Iโve worked in, anyway.
What helped us fix it
- We moved unknown wired devices into an isolated VLAN with internet-only access, which took an afternoon and caused no drama.
- I started a simple monthly habit of skimming DHCP logs for new hostnames. Unfamiliar names pop out fast once youโve seen the normal ones.
- We wrote a short, friendly note about where personal devices belong, and we hand it out during onboarding instead of burying it in a policy wiki.
- We also agreed that the first response to a shadow device should be a conversation, not a ticket storm. People cooperate when they donโt feel accused.
Things Iโd tell a peer
If you manage a network, assume there is at least one personal machine on it right now. That assumption has been correct at every company Iโve worked for, including the ones with strict written policies. Finding it early is cheap; finding it during an incident is not. Iโve watched an incident review get derailed for an hour because nobody could say whether a specific laptop belonged to the company or to a contractor.
The human side matters more than the technical side here. My coworker wasnโt careless, he was solving a video call problem the only way he knew how. When we fixed the guest network instead of lecturing him, the shadow laptop quietly disappeared on its own within a week. Nobody had to lose face, and I didnโt have to write a single escalation email, which is honestly my favorite kind of outcome. Remove the reason people cheat, and most of the cheating removes itself.
Closing thoughts
No breach, no ransom note, no tense Monday meeting. Just a second laptop, a slow guest network, and a small gap that had been open longer than anyone realized. These are the stories that never make the news but fill up most of my calendar anyway.
If youโve got ten minutes this week, skim your own device lists and see what looks unfamiliar. It might be someoneโs weekend side project, and a friendly chat will probably resolve it faster than any firewall rule. Worth trying before anything more dramatic.
References
https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final
https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/
https://www.cisa.gov/secure-our-world
https://www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/cyber-threats
Originally published by Dev.to Security. Aggregated on AIWithGhost for educational purposes โ full credit and traffic to the original publisher.

