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NGINX2Root: Two HTTP/2 Memory Corruption Bugs Lead to Pre-Auth RCE and Kernel Flaw Chain to Host Root

1. Overview Article Name: Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution in NGINX: CVE-2026-123633 and CVE-2026-123007 Source: Wiz Research (Wiz Blog) Published Date: November 18, 2026 Original: Wiz Research Related Sour

1. Overview

2. Quick Summary

Pre-authentication RCE as the worker user has been demonstrated on unpatched NGINX instances with a reachable HTTP/2 listener, originating from a flow-control memory corruption or a use-after-free during proxy processing. Furthermore, researchers showed that container escape and host root privileges can be achieved by chaining this with a separate Linux SCTP vulnerability.

3. Attack Flow

Attack vectors A, B, D, E, and F are independent. Phase C is a verification path demonstrated by Xint, which chains another Linux SCTP vulnerability after the success of A. The following describes exploitation paths explained by the researchers; it does not indicate observed exploitation in the wild.

Attack Vector A: HTTP/2 RCE via CVE-2026-123007

  1. Send crafted frame sequences to the HTTP/2 handler in affected versions.
  2. Trigger out-of-bounds copying and heap corruption due to flow-control calculation inconsistencies.
  3. Successful exploitation executes code with NGINX worker privileges.

Attack Vector B: HTTP/2 Proxy RCE via CVE-2026-123633

  1. Send fragmented HEADERS frames to the HTTP/2 proxy in affected versions.
  2. Force the release of connection memory currently in use under conditions such as backend connection slot exhaustion.
  3. Leverage the use-after-free condition to execute code with NGINX worker privileges upon successful exploitation.

Phase C: Host Root Acquisition via Linux SCTP Vulnerability Following Success of A

  1. Start from the code execution achieved with NGINX worker privileges inside the container.
  2. Exploit a separate SCTP vulnerability on an affected kernel reachable via SCTP.
  3. Gain control of the host kernel, crossing the container boundary to escalate to host root privileges.

Attack Vector D: HTTP/3 Proxy Path via CVE-2026-121810

  1. Send crafted traffic to affected configurations forwarding to a backend via HTTP/3.
  2. Leverage the HTTP/3 use-after-free to execute code with NGINX worker privileges upon successful exploitation.

Attack Vector E: Resolver Path via CVE-2026-123634

  1. Trigger request-driven name resolution and subrequests in affected configurations.
  2. Leverage the resolver response handling use-after-free to execute code with NGINX worker privileges upon successful exploitation.

Attack Vector F: Mail Proxy Path via CVE-2026-113425

  1. Send crafted authentication traffic to affected mail proxies using proxy on and auth_http.
  2. Leverage the use-after-free to execute code with NGINX worker privileges upon successful exploitation.

4. Attacker Position and Execution Location

The attacker is an unauthenticated remote actor who can reach the HTTP/2 listener. CVE-2026-123633 also requires a backend proxy configuration. Attack vectors D, E, and F involve attackers who can reach the HTTP/3 proxy, resolver path, and mail proxy, respectively.

5. Victim and Administrator Perspective

May appear as service disruptions, authentication anomalies, configuration tampering, or data access. Administrators correlate requests, processes, files, and account changes along the same timeline.

6. Success and Failure Conditions

Success Conditions

  • Unpatched NGINX
  • Reachable HTTP/2 listener
  • Backend proxy configuration for CVE-2026-123633

Failure/Mitigation Conditions

  • Open Source stable 1.30.x upgraded to 1.30.7 or later, mainline 1.31.x upgraded to 1.31.9 or later, or Plus fixed versions (37.0.7.1/37.2.0.1 or later for CVE-2026-123633, 37.0.8.1/37.3.0.1 or later for CVE-2026-123007)
  • Disabling HTTP/2 mitigates the two main vectors
  • Backported packages provided by vendors

For CVE-2026-123633, in addition to the HTTP/2 proxy, the release of in-progress connections due to reasons such as connection slot exhaustion is involved. The SCTP chain requires an affected kernel and reachability to SCTP; NGINX RCE alone does not grant host root privileges.

7. What Happens Upon Success

  • Code execution or DoS with NGINX worker privileges
  • Access to web content or upstream credentials
  • Container escape and host root acquisition when chained with another kernel vulnerability

8. Observable Logs

  • Worker crashes and restarts associated with HTTP/2 processing
  • Segmentation faults, heap corruption, and core dumps
  • Unknown processes, shell spawning, or outbound communications immediately following HTTP/2 sessions

Because HTTP/2 control frames are not logged as requests in standard access logs, the absence of crafted requests in logs does not rule out attack attempts. Worker abnormal terminations and child process generation are general investigation indicators and not IOCs specific to these CVEs.

9. Determining Attack Success

  • Attempt: Crafted requests to vulnerable endpoints or protocols.
  • Execution: Spawning of unexpected processes, accounts, files, or commands.
  • Impact: Data access, privilege escalation, persistence, or service disruption.
  • Attempt logs alone do not confirm successful compromise.
  • For attack vectors D, E, and F, no active exploitation attempts or successful compromises have been confirmed in the wild.

10. Investigation Playbook

  1. Verify version, configuration, patch status, and external reachability.
  2. Preserve raw logs, process trees, file metadata, and account/credential changes.
  3. Correlate crafted requests to code execution and privilege escalation chronologically.
  4. Search for lateral movement, data access, and outbound communication across all assets.
  5. Isolate and update targets, and rotate related credentials and tokens.

11. Defense and Detection Ideas

  • Single Event: Worker crashes and restarts associated with HTTP/2 processing
  • Timeline: Correlate anomalous requests with process or account changes.
  • Hunting: Broadly search for identical IOCs, source IPs, accounts, and file hashes.
  • Prioritized Mitigation: Update NGINX Open Source to 1.30.7 or later for stable 1.30.x, and 1.31.9 or later for mainline 1.31.x. For Plus, update to 37.0.7.1/37.2.0.1 or later for CVE-2026-123633, and 37.0.8.1/37.3.0.1 or later for CVE-2026-123007. Disabling HTTP/2 in an emergency mitigates only the two main vectors.

12. Facts / Inference / Hypothesis

Facts

  • Wiz demonstrated pre-auth RCE from two main vectors.
  • The official NGINX security advisories list mainline 1.31.x versions 1.31.9 and later, and stable 1.30.x versions 1.30.7 and later, as non-vulnerable.
  • Active exploitation in the wild has not been confirmed at the time of publication.

Inference

  • Because version banners alone cannot determine whether HTTP/2 is enabled or backports are applied, scan counts do not reflect the actual number of vulnerable instances.

Hypothesis

  • None. Attack scope or victim counts beyond published information are not asserted.

13. MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

ID Technique Confidence Basis
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application high Addressing public HTTP/2 paths for attack vectors A and B. Does not indicate observed active exploitation.
T1611 Escape to Host high Addressing behavior where Xint, in a test environment, exploited a separate Linux SCTP vulnerability from the NGINX worker inside the container to reach the host past the container boundary.
T1068 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation high Addressing behavior where Xint, in a test environment, exploited a separate Linux SCTP vulnerability from NGINX worker privileges to escalate to host root privileges.

14. Uncertainties and Further Investigation

  • Whether active exploitation in the wild has begun
  • Backport statuses for each distribution

15. Impact on SOCs and Organizations

Correlate HTTP/2 abnormal terminations and process generation/outbound communication following worker crashes, and verify configurations and backports in addition to versions.

16. Summary by Role

  • SOC: Correlate HTTP/2 abnormal terminations and process generation/outbound communication following worker crashes, and verify configurations and backports in addition to versions.
  • Administrators: Update to Open Source 1.30.7/1.31.9 or Plus 37.0.8.1/37.3.0.1. Disabling HTTP/2 in an emergency mitigates only the two main vectors.
  • Users: End users have no workarounds; administrator updates and compromise verification are required.
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