nginx2root (CVE-2026-123007): what it is, who is exposed, and what to do today
This article was first published on the Rokkhe blog on Hashnode. It was drafted with AI assistance and reviewed and edited by the Rokkhe team; all facts were checked against the linked public sources as of 20 Nov 2026.
This article was first published on the Rokkhe blog on Hashnode. It was drafted with AI assistance and reviewed and edited by the Rokkhe team; all facts were checked against the linked public sources as of 20 Nov 2026.
What is known about nginx2root (CVE-2026-123007 and four related nginx bugs) as of 20 Nov 2026, from 40+ public sources. By the Rokkhe research team.
On 18 November 2026, nginx.org released nginx 1.31.9 (mainline) and 1.30.7 (stable) with fixes for ten security bugs (nginx news, nginx advisories). Five of them are memory corruption bugs that an unauthenticated attacker can use to crash an nginx worker and, in researchers' tests, run code on the server. Xint, one of the teams that found them, calls the set nginx2root (Xint). The one that matters for most people is CVE-2026-123007, a flaw in HTTP/2 flow control that has been in every nginx release since HTTP/2 support arrived in 1.9.5 in 2015 (Xint, Rapid7).
If you run nginx with HTTP/2 turned on, this post is for you. We read the nginx changelog and fix commits, the researcher write-ups, the F5, distribution and government advisories, the security vendor analyses, the news and the discussion, and put it in one place. Every claim links to where it came from. Where sources disagree, we say so. The short version: find every nginx you run, including the ones inside containers, ingress controllers and appliances, update it, restart it, and turn HTTP/2 off on any listener you cannot patch today.
Credit first. Xint researchers found all five memory bugs: one researcher found CVE-2026-123007 by hand and an automated Xint scan found the other four (Xint, Cloudflare). The two HTTP/2 bugs were also found independently by Wiz Research, Rapid7 (Stephen Fewer), Ikotas Labs, Metnir and Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 (Wiz, Rapid7, Cloudflare). The other five fixes in the release credit Marc Luchian and Liviu-Alexandru Bud, CERT.PL, ruokeqx, Vivek Parikh of BreachX Zero Day Labs and Maxim Dounin (nginx CHANGES). Thanks also to the nginx and F5 teams for shipping fixes for all of it in one release.
What happened
- September to November 2026. The fixes were written over several weeks. The HTTP/2 flow-control fix is dated 29 Oct and the HTTP/2 use-after-free fix 17 Sep, and both were pushed to the public nginx repository on 11 Nov, a week before the release (commit e27f5fa, commit 2df48a5, StepSecurity).
- Oct and Nov. Xint reported its findings to F5 through HackerOne on 16 Oct. Wiz reported the HTTP/2 use-after-free with a working exploit on 21 Oct, and F5 told Wiz another team had already reported it. Rapid7 reported CVE-2026-123007 on 12 Nov, and Wiz reported it again on 16 Nov (Sysdig, Wiz, Rapid7).
- 18 Nov, about 16:00 UTC. nginx 1.31.9 and 1.30.7 were tagged on GitHub (1.31.9 release). F5 published its advisories, with K000164058 as the index (oss-security). Xint, Wiz, Rapid7 and JFrog published write-ups the same day, and CERT-EU, CERT-FR and the Canadian Cyber Centre issued alerts (CERT-EU, CERT-FR, Cyber Centre).
- 18 to 20 Nov. Amazon Linux, Ubuntu, Alpine, Debian and Red Hat shipped fixed packages, and the official Docker images were rebuilt (see the table below). Cloudflare and Sysdig published analysis and detection notes (Cloudflare, Sysdig).
The five bugs at a glance
Each bug is a separate way in. They do not need to be chained, and each one needs a different feature turned on (Xint, Cloudflare).
| CVE | What it is | What has to be turned on | Affected open source versions |
|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-123007 | HTTP/2 flow-control memory corruption | HTTP/2 on a listener. Works even when nginx only serves static files | 1.9.5 to 1.31.8 |
| CVE-2026-123633 | HTTP/2 use-after-free | HTTP/2, proxying to a backend, and a worker running low on worker_connections
|
1.19.7 to 1.31.8 |
| CVE-2026-121810 | HTTP/3 use-after-free | HTTP/3 (QUIC), proxying to a backend | 1.25.0 to 1.31.8 |
| CVE-2026-123634 | Resolver use-after-free |
resolver, a proxy_pass built from request data, and a subrequest such as mirror or SSI |
0.6.18 to 1.31.8 |
| CVE-2026-113425 | Mail proxy use-after-free | a mail block with proxy on and auth_http. No valid login needed |
0.5.33 to 1.31.8 |
Sources: nginx advisories, CERT-EU, JFrog, Red Hat.
F5 rates all five 9.2 (Critical) under CVSS 4.0 and 8.1 (High) under CVSS 3.1, and says code execution needs ASLR to be off or bypassed (NVD, Censys). Xint reports code execution as the nginx worker for each of the five, including leaking addresses to get past ASLR (Xint, Hadrian).
How CVE-2026-123007 works, in plain terms
HTTP/2 lets a client tell the server how much response data it may send before waiting. nginx keeps a running counter of that allowance for each connection, and the protocol caps it at 2^31 minus 1 bytes (Rapid7).
When a client cancels a stream that still has data queued, nginx gives the unsent allowance back to the counter. That refund had no upper-bound check. A client can grant the same amount once with a WINDOW_UPDATE frame and then get it refunded a second time by cancelling, which pushes the counter past the cap (Xint). From there, the check on later WINDOW_UPDATE frames wraps around, the oversized counter turns into a negative length when nginx prepares data to send, and the TLS layer copies memory out of bounds. That can leak memory and corrupt the heap (JFrog, Rapid7).
The fix is small: nginx now tracks data already queued for sending and counts it when it validates a WINDOW_UPDATE, so the counter can no longer pass the cap (commit b89c410, JFrog). Cloudflare built 1.31.8 and 1.31.9 with AddressSanitizer and saw four of the five bugs fault on 1.31.8 and run clean on 1.31.9 (Cloudflare).
How hard is it to exploit?
Harder than "send one request", easier than you would like.
- Lots of traffic. Rapid7's exploit needs about 128 GB of HTTP/2 data on one connection. Over 1 Gbit/s that is about 17 minutes, and because nginx closes connections after one hour by default, a link slower than about 300 Mbit/s cannot finish (Rapid7).
-
Specific conditions for the public exploit. Rapid7's technique relies on the AVX-512 version of glibc's
memcpy. StepSecurity reports that the exploit's instructions say earlier tests failed on servers already handling heavy traffic, and notes the bug itself does not need AVX-512: it crashed a worker on a CPU without it (Rapid7, StepSecurity). - But it works over the internet. Xint ran its exploit over the public internet against servers on AWS, GCP and Azure (Xint, Cloudflare). Wiz showed code execution on nginx serving ordinary static files, with no backend and no third-party module (Wiz).
- A proxy in front helps. If a CDN or reverse proxy terminates HTTP/2 before nginx, the attacker's frames are not passed through as sent (Rapid7, Cloudflare). That only holds if the origin cannot be reached directly. Xint's advice: if a CDN sits in front, run your exposure check against the nginx server itself too (Xint).
The "to root" part: a Linux kernel bug
Xint also found a use-after-free in the Linux kernel's SCTP code, present since Linux 4.15 (2018). Code already running as the nginx worker can use it to become root on the host, and Xint did this from nginx inside a Docker container (Xint, LWN). Many distributions load the SCTP module automatically the first time a program opens an SCTP socket, so hosts that never use SCTP can still be exposed. In Sysdig's lab, one SCTP socket opened from the worker was enough to load it (Sysdig). As of 18 to 19 Nov there was no CVE and no kernel fix, and Xint is holding back details until there is one (Cloudflare, Sysdig).
Is it being exploited?
Not that anyone has confirmed, as of 20 Nov.
- None of the five CVEs is in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (catalog version 2026.11.18, checked 20 Nov), and CISA's SSVC entry in the CVE record says exploitation "none" and "not automatable" (CISA KEV, NVD).
- CERT-EU reports no exploitation in the wild, and Cloudflare had seen no reports of it as of 19 Nov (CERT-EU, Cloudflare).
- Rapid7 has published a proof of concept for CVE-2026-123007. CERT-FR and Red Hat both note a public proof of concept exists (CERT-FR, Red Hat). Xint and Wiz have not released theirs (Cloudflare, BleepingComputer).
- Cloudflare warns that fake "exploits" are circulating on GitHub (Cloudflare). Do not run them, on your servers or your laptop.
Five teams found the same HTTP/2 bugs independently, several with AI-assisted code analysis (JFrog, Wiz). Plan as if someone who does not publish found them too.
Where sources disagree
- Severity. nginx.org rates CVE-2026-123007 and CVE-2026-113425 "major" and CVE-2026-123633, CVE-2026-121810 and CVE-2026-123634 "medium" (nginx advisories). F5 scores all five 9.2 under CVSS 4.0 and 8.1 under CVSS 3.1 (NVD). CERT-EU quotes only the 8.1 (CERT-EU). Red Hat scores all five 8.1 and rates them Critical or Important (Red Hat). Ubuntu gives CVE-2026-123007 "High" priority (Ubuntu).
- What kind of bug CVE-2026-123007 is. Rapid7 calls it an integer underflow (CWE-191). Xint and CERT-EU call it an integer overflow, and Red Hat files it as a heap buffer overflow (CWE-787). The NVD record lists both CWEs (Rapid7, Xint, Red Hat, NVD). It is the same bug: the counter overflows its cap, and a later subtraction underflows.
- The name. Xint, Cloudflare and Sysdig say nginx2root. JFrog and ZEST say Nginx2Shell (JFrog, ZEST). Jan Schaumann on oss-security points out that the "root" part depends on the separate kernel bug (oss-security).
- Credit. The nginx changelog credits Xint.io for CVE-2026-123007 and "Albert of Vexera AI" for CVE-2026-123633. F5's credits, as reported by Cloudflare, add Rapid7, Wiz Research and Ikotas Labs for the first, and Metnir, Wiz Research and Unit 42 for the second. Ubuntu's notice names Stephen Fewer, Tomer Schwartz, Albert Ebb Metnir and Nir Ohfeld (nginx CHANGES, Cloudflare, USN-9159-1).
- Public exploit. Sysdig wrote on 19 Nov that there was no public proof of concept. Cloudflare, CERT-FR and Red Hat say Rapid7's is public (Sysdig, Cloudflare, CERT-FR). One CVE aggregator labels CVE-2026-123007 "actively exploited", citing VulnCheck and CERT-FR (NEOSEC). We could not confirm that: CERT-FR's alert mentions a public proof of concept, not attacks, and CISA's catalog does not list it.
- NGINX Plus. F5, Rapid7 and CERT-EU list Plus R34 to R36 as affected with no fixed build. JFrog writes "R33 and later" (Rapid7, CERT-EU, JFrog). Either way, the answer is to move to a fixed 37.x build.
- How many servers are exposed. Xint's Shodan snapshot on 10 Nov found 98.9% of the 11.94 million nginx hosts that report a version in the affected range. Censys counted about 8.8 million services on an affected version with HTTP/2 on, as of 19 Nov (Xint, BleepingComputer). Florian Roth, quoted by BleepingComputer, says the flaws are exploitable in non-default configurations and calls version-only exposure claims misleading (BleepingComputer). Version strings also miss backported fixes (Cloudflare). Both points are true. Check your own config, not internet counts.
- A typo on nginx.org. The advisory page lists the HTTP/3 bug as "CVE-CVE-2026-121810". The correct ID is CVE-2026-121810 (nginx advisories, nginx CHANGES). Search for both if your scanner keys on the advisory text.
Am I exposed?
Work through these on every host and container that runs nginx. The nginx commands below were tested on Debian 13 with nginx 1.26.3.
1. Find every nginx. That includes distribution packages, nginx.org packages, official and third-party container images, Kubernetes ingress controllers, OpenResty, NGINX Plus, and appliances that ship nginx inside (Cloudflare, JFrog). OpenResty 1.31.8.1 is built on nginx 1.31.8 and is affected until it ships a new build (OpenResty issue #1165).
# Hosts
pgrep -a nginx
# Kubernetes: images that look like nginx
kubectl get pods -A -o jsonpath='{range .items[*]}{.metadata.namespace}{"\t"}{.metadata.name}{"\t"}{.spec.containers[*].image}{"\n"}{end}' | grep -iE 'nginx|openresty|ingress'
2. Check the version and the full package version.
nginx -v
# Debian / Ubuntu
dpkg-query -W -f='${Package} ${Version}\n' 'nginx*'
# RHEL / Fedora / Amazon Linux
rpm -q nginx
# Alpine
apk info -v nginx
# Inside a container or pod
docker exec <container> nginx -v
kubectl exec -n <ns> <pod> -- nginx -v
Upstream 1.31.9 and later, or 1.30.7 and later, are fixed. Distributions backport the fix without changing what nginx -v prints, so compare the full package version with the table below (Xint, Cloudflare). For example, Debian 13 still reports nginx/1.26.3 after the fix; the fixed package is 1.26.3-3+deb13u11 (Debian).
3. Check which modules are compiled in.
nginx -V 2>&1 | tr ' ' '\n' | grep -E '^--with-(http_v2_module|http_v3_module|mail|stream)'
No --with-http_v2_module means the HTTP/2 code is not in the binary and CVE-2026-123007 and CVE-2026-123633 do not apply (Xint). On Debian and Ubuntu, mail and stream are often dynamic modules (--with-mail=dynamic), so also check what is loaded:
ls /etc/nginx/modules-enabled/ 2>/dev/null
4. Check the running config for each risky feature. nginx -T prints the full config nginx would load. The sed strips comments.
# HTTP/2 on? (CVE-2026-123007; plus a backend for CVE-2026-123633)
sudo nginx -T 2>/dev/null | sed 's/#.*//' | grep -nE '\bhttp2\s+on\b|\blisten\s[^;]*\bhttp2\b'
# Proxying to a backend? (CVE-2026-123633, CVE-2026-121810)
sudo nginx -T 2>/dev/null | sed 's/#.*//' | grep -nE '\b(proxy|fastcgi|uwsgi|scgi|grpc|memcached)_pass\s'
# HTTP/3 or QUIC on? (CVE-2026-121810)
sudo nginx -T 2>/dev/null | sed 's/#.*//' | grep -nE '\bhttp3\s+on\b|\blisten\s[^;]*\bquic\b'
# Resolver, proxy_pass with variables, mirror or SSI? (CVE-2026-123634)
sudo nginx -T 2>/dev/null | sed 's/#.*//' | grep -nE '\bresolver\s|\bproxy_pass\s+[^;]*\$|\bmirror\s|\bssi\s+on\b'
# Mail proxy with auth_http? (CVE-2026-113425)
sudo nginx -T 2>/dev/null | sed 's/#.*//' | grep -nE '^\s*mail\s*\{|\bauth_http\s'
nginx -T reads the config on disk. If someone changed it without reloading, the running config may differ (Xint).
5. Check whether HTTP/2 is reachable from outside. Run this from a machine outside your network, against the nginx server itself and not only your CDN hostname (Xint):
openssl s_client -connect HOST:443 -servername HOST -alpn h2 </dev/null 2>&1 | grep -E 'ALPN protocol|No ALPN negotiated'
ALPN protocol: h2 means HTTP/2 is reachable. An unpatched build plus that result is the case to fix first.
Fixed versions by platform
Status as of 20 Nov 2026. Distribution packages move fast this week, so re-check your vendor's page before you act on this table.
| Platform | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| nginx open source | 1.31.9 (mainline), 1.30.7 (stable). Older branches get no fix | nginx advisories, Censys tracker |
| NGINX Plus | 37.3.0.1 or 37.0.8.1. R34 to R36 have no fixed build, so move to 37.x | Rapid7, Cloudflare |
| F5 NGINX Ingress Controller | NVD lists versions before 5.8.0, and before 2026-lts-r11 on the LTS track, as affected. Confirm the fixed build in F5's advisory | NVD |
| F5 NGINX Gateway Fabric | NVD lists 2.x before 2.9.0, and 1.5.0 to 1.6.2, as affected. Confirm the fixed build in F5's advisory | NVD |
| Official Docker images |
nginx:1.31.9, nginx:1.30.7 and their -alpine, -trixie, -slim and -perl variants, pushed 18 to 19 Nov (UTC) |
Docker Hub |
| Ubuntu 26.10 / 26.04 / 24.04 / 22.04 | 1.30.4-7ubuntu1.2 / 1.28.3-2ubuntu1.13 / 1.24.0-2ubuntu7.20 / 1.18.0-6ubuntu14.23. 20.04, 18.04 and 16.04 through Ubuntu Pro | Ubuntu, USN-9159-1 |
| Debian 13 trixie / 12 bookworm | 1.26.3-3+deb13u11 (DSA-6642-1) / 1.22.1-9+deb12u11 (DLA-4918-1). sid fixed in 1.30.6-4; forky still vulnerable | Debian |
| RHEL | RHEL 9 nginx:1.24 module fixed in RHSA-2026:100746 (20 Nov). Red Hat lists RHEL 8, 9 and 10 as affected, so check each stream | RHSA-2026:100746, RHSB-2026-019 |
| Amazon Linux 2023 / Amazon Linux 2 (nginx1 extra) | 1.30.7-1.amzn2023.0.1 (ALAS2023-2026-3494) / 1.30.7-1.amzn2.0.1 (ALAS2NGINX1-2026-018) | ALAS, ZEST |
| Alpine 3.24 / 3.23 / 3.22 | 1.30.7-r0 / 1.28.3-r8 / 1.28.3-r8 | Alpine secdb |
| Arch | nginx 1.30.7-1, nginx-mainline 1.31.9-1 | Hadrian |
| kubernetes/ingress-nginx (community) | No upstream fix. The project was archived on 24 Mar 2026 | ingress-nginx, JFrog |
Two gaps worth knowing about:
- Archived ingress-nginx. If you still run the community controller, you depend on whoever builds your image. Some hardened-image vendors publish their own patched builds (NEOSEC). Managed add-ons built on it may lag: an open issue on Azure's AKS app routing add-on reports its image ships nginx 1.27.1 with HTTP/2 on by default and no supported way to turn it off (AKS issue #623). Treat this as the push to migrate.
-
nginx.org RPM repos. An open issue reports that the nginx.org EL9 repository has 1.30.7 but no security metadata for it, so
dnf upgrade --securitycan skip it (nginx issue #2002). Upgrade the package by name.
How to patch
# Debian / Ubuntu
sudo apt update && sudo apt install --only-upgrade nginx nginx-common nginx-core
# RHEL / Fedora / Amazon Linux (by name, not --security, see above)
sudo dnf upgrade nginx
# Alpine
sudo apk update && sudo apk upgrade nginx
# Containers: rebuild on a fixed base, then redeploy
docker pull nginx:1.30.7 # or nginx:1.31.9
Package names vary by distribution and by how nginx was installed, so adjust the list to what step 2 showed.
Then restart, do not just reload. A reload does not replace the running binary (Cloudflare, Xint). Afterwards, confirm that no old workers are left:
sudo systemctl restart nginx
ps -eo pid,lstart,args | grep '[n]ginx'
Every nginx process should show a start time after the upgrade. Then repeat step 2 to confirm the new package version is what is running.
Stopgaps if you cannot patch today
These block the known attack paths. None of them replaces the patch (Xint, CERT-EU).
-
Turn off HTTP/2 (CVE-2026-123007, CVE-2026-123633). On nginx 1.25.1 and later, set
http2 off;in each affected server block and removehttp2fromlistenlines. On older versions, changelisten 443 ssl http2;tolisten 443 ssl;. Check every server block that shares the same address and port. Clients fall back to HTTP/1.1, but native gRPC and anything else that needs HTTP/2 will break (Xint, JFrog). Disabling HTTP/2 covers only two of the five bugs. -
Turn off HTTP/3 (CVE-2026-121810). Remove
quiclisteners, sethttp3 off;, and replace anyAlt-Svcheader advertising HTTP/3 withAlt-Svc 'clear'(Xint). -
Use fixed upstreams (CVE-2026-123634). Point
proxy_passat a fixedupstreamgroup instead of a name built from the request. Do not rely onmirror_request_body onalone: it stopped Xint's tested exploit, but SSI and other subrequests can still reach the bug (Xint, Cloudflare). - Keep strangers off the mail proxy (CVE-2026-113425). Bind IMAP, POP3 and SMTP listeners to loopback, or allow only trusted IPs at the firewall (Xint).
-
Block the SCTP module if you do not use it. Add
install sctp /bin/falseto a file in/etc/modprobe.d/. It does not unload a module that is already loaded (lsmod | grep sctp), does not help where SCTP is built into the kernel, and breaks workloads that use SCTP, such as telecom signalling and some Kubernetes network plugins (Sysdig, Cloudflare). - Close the direct path to origins behind a CDN. If your origin can be reached only through the CDN (tunnel, IP allowlist at the firewall, or authenticated origin pulls), the HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 attacks stop at the edge. A WAF rule does not help here: these are protocol-level bugs (Cloudflare).
After a reload, old workers keep serving existing HTTP/2 and mail connections with the old config until they close (nginx: worker process is shutting down in ps). Restart if they linger (Xint).
Detection ideas
There are no confirmed indicators of compromise yet, and none of these signals proves an attack on its own (JFrog, CERT-EU).
-
A program started by an nginx worker. A normal worker has no reason to run
/bin/shor anything else. Xint calls this the clearest sign of a successful attack, and suggests anauditdrule onexecvefor the worker's UID (Xint). Sysdig notes Falco's open source rules catch a shell or new binary started by the worker (Sysdig). -
Worker crashes.
worker process <pid> exited on signal 11in the error log, especially on servers that accept HTTP/2 or HTTP/3 and proxy upstream. A use-after-free does not always crash (Cloudflare, CERT-EU).
sudo grep -Ei 'worker process.*exited|signal 11|segfault' /var/log/nginx/error.log
-
Lopsided HTTP/2 connections. One long-lived connection where nginx receives tens of gigabytes and sends little back, far more than its logged requests explain. The attack's control frames are not logged as requests (Cloudflare, Xint). Xint suggests comparing
ss -tinpbyte counts with a log format that records$connectionand$request_length. -
Log lines on patched versions. A rejected attempt on fixed builds logs
client violated connection flow control: received WINDOW_UPDATE frame with window increment ... not allowed for window ...atinfolevel, below nginx's defaulterrorlevel (Cloudflare). -
Resolver and mail.
could not cancel <name> resolvingatalertlevel on unpatched versions, and worker crashes in a mail proxy usingauth_httpwith connections reset during login (Cloudflare).
Patching does not undo a past compromise. If an exposed, unpatched server shows any of the signals above, investigate before you close the ticket.
The other five fixes in the same release
The release also fixes five lower-impact bugs. They are worth the same upgrade (nginx CHANGES, Wiz, NVD):
- CVE-2026-118899: a worker can get stuck in an endless loop while reading a request body over TLS 1.3, a denial of service. Affects 1.13.0 to 1.31.8. CVSS 4.0 8.7, and nginx.org rates it "major".
-
CVE-2026-125283: buffer overflow with
try_filesandaliasin certain configurations (0.9.6 to 1.31.8). - CVE-2026-120967: in the stream module, client certificates could be checked against the default server instead of the one picked by SNI (1.25.5 to 1.31.8).
-
CVE-2026-123640:
ssl_prereadcould read malformed ClientHello messages differently from other TLS stacks, which might bypass restrictions (1.15.2 to 1.31.8). - CVE-2026-120993: crash with PROXY protocol v2 and dynamic certificate loading, mainline only (1.31.4 to 1.31.8).
nginx's advisory list grew from 2 entries in 2025 to 36 so far in 2026 (Cloudflare, Xint). If you pin nginx and patch it twice a year, that schedule no longer fits.
Where Rokkhe helps
We did not find these bugs. Xint, Wiz, Rapid7 and the other teams did the hard work. What we can do is help you get through the week.
Exposure review. We go through your hosts, container images, ingress controllers and configs with you, and map each nginx to its real package version, its compiled modules and the features each of the five bugs needs.
Testing what you own. For systems you own and authorise us to test, Rokkhe's AI agents check which listeners accept HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 from the internet, whether origins behind a CDN can be reached directly, and whether the fix or the stopgap is live on the running process. We will not run public exploit chains against your production systems.
Watching while you patch. Our SOC can watch for the signals above in your logs while fixed packages roll out.
Book an evaluation
If you run nginx in production and want a second pair of eyes on your exposure this week, book an evaluation at rokkhe.com. Patching Java this week too? See our write-up on Java4Shell (CVE-2026-114938).
Sources
Project sources
- nginx security advisories: https://nginx.org/en/security_advisories.html
- nginx news (release announcement, 18 Nov): https://nginx.org/
- nginx CHANGES (mainline 1.31.9): https://nginx.org/en/CHANGES
- nginx CHANGES-1.30 (stable 1.30.7): https://nginx.org/en/CHANGES-1.30
- GitHub release 1.31.9: https://github.com/nginx/nginx/releases/tag/release-1.31.9
- Fix commit, HTTP/2 flow control (1.30.7): https://github.com/nginx/nginx/commit/b89c4100bf6762a45e4a6463eaf4b70368277c94
- Fix commit, HTTP/2 flow control (mainline): https://github.com/nginx/nginx/commit/e27f5fa84fe
- Fix commit, HTTP/2 use-after-free: https://github.com/nginx/nginx/commit/2df48a501d0
- nginx issue #2002, RPM security metadata: https://github.com/nginx/nginx/issues/2002
- oss-security post (Jan Schaumann, 18 Nov): https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/11/18/16
Researcher write-ups
- Xint, "NGINX2Root": https://xint.io/blog/nginx2root-remote-code-execution
- Wiz Research: https://www.wiz.io/blog/nginx-http2-rce-vulnerabilities
- Rapid7 (Stephen Fewer): https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/ve-cve-2026-123007-critical-nginx-http-2-integer-underflow-leads-to-rce-fixed/
- JFrog Security Research: https://research.jfrog.com/post/nginx2shell-all-you-need-to-know-about-cve-2026-123007-and-cve-2026-123633/
Vulnerability records and government advisories
- NVD, CVE-2026-123007: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2026-123007
- NVD, CVE-2026-118899: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2026-118899
- CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog
- CERT-EU Security Advisory 2026-022: https://www.cert.europa.eu/publications/security-advisories/2026-022/
- CERT-FR CERTFR-2026-ALE-017: https://www.cert.cyber.gouv.fr/alerte/CERTFR-2026-ALE-017
- Canadian Centre for Cyber Security AV26-1174: https://www.cyber.gc.ca/en/alerts-advisories/f5-security-advisory-av26-1174
Distributions and images
- Ubuntu CVE page: https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2026-123007
- Ubuntu USN-9159-1: https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-9159-1
- Debian security tracker: https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-123007
- Red Hat RHSB-2026-019: https://access.redhat.com/security/vulnerabilities/RHSB-2026-019
- Red Hat RHSA-2026:100746: https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:100746
- Red Hat CVE page: https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/cve-2026-123007
- Amazon Linux ALAS2023-2026-3494: https://alas.aws.amazon.com/AL2023/ALAS2023-2026-3494.html
- Alpine secdb: https://secdb.alpinelinux.org/v3.24/main.json
- Docker Hub, official nginx image: https://hub.docker.com/_/nginx/tags
- kubernetes/ingress-nginx (archived): https://github.com/kubernetes/ingress-nginx
- OpenResty issue #1165: https://github.com/openresty/openresty/issues/1165
- AKS app routing operator issue #623: https://github.com/Azure/aks-app-routing-operator/issues/623
Security vendor analysis
- Cloudflare: https://blog.cloudflare.com/nginx2root/
- Sysdig: https://www.sysdig.com/blog/nginx2root
- StepSecurity: https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/cve-2026-123007-nginx-http2-rce
- ZEST Security: https://www.zestsecurity.io/resources/content/nginx2shell-cve-2026-123007-cve-2026-123633
- Censys advisory: https://censys.com/advisory/nginx2root/
- Censys exposure tracker: https://nginx2root.censys.io/
- Hadrian: https://hadrian.io/vulnerability-alerts/nginx-cve-2026-123007-remote-code-execution-confirmed
- NEOSEC CVE page: https://intel.neosec.eu/en/cve/CVE-2026-123007
News and discussion
- BleepingComputer: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/critical-nginx-nginx2root-bugs-let-attackers-hijack-servers/
- CyberScoop: https://cyberscoop.com/nginx-critical-vulnerabilities-exploits/
- LWN: https://lwn.net/Articles/1108362/
- Hacker News discussion: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50547374
Rokkhe SAS is based in Strasbourg, France. This post reflects public sources as of 20 Nov 2026 (Asia/Dhaka) and will be updated as vendors ship fixes or exploitation is reported.
Disclosure: this post was drafted with AI assistance and reviewed and edited by the Rokkhe team. Every claim was checked against the linked public sources as of 20 Nov 2026.
Originally published by Dev.to Security. Aggregated on AIWithGhost for educational purposes — full credit and traffic to the original publisher.