Most webhook tutorials verify signatures wrong — here's the one that matches Stripe/GitHub/Shopify specs
Webhook signature verification is one of those things everyone copies from a blog post and nobody actually checks against the provider's spec. The failure modes are subtle and they all end the same way: your endpoint acc
Webhook signature verification is one of those things everyone copies from a blog post and nobody actually checks against the provider's spec. The failure modes are subtle and they all end the same way: your endpoint accepts forged events.
I keep finding the same four bugs in webhook code:
-
Wrong signed payload. Stripe doesn't sign the raw body — it signs
timestamp.body. Copy a generic HMAC example and your Stripe verification will never match, or worse, you'll "fix" it by disabling verification. -
No timestamp tolerance. A captured valid signature replays forever. Stripe's
t=prefix exists precisely so you can reject old events — most tutorials skip it. -
Non-constant-time compare.
===on hex strings leaks timing. Providers' SDKs use constant-time compare for a reason. - Verifying the re-serialized body. Parse JSON then re-stringify and the bytes changed — the signature was computed over the raw bytes.
What correct looks like per provider
-
Stripe: header is
t=timestamp,v1=signature; signed payload ist + "." + rawBody; reject if|now - t| > tolerance -
GitHub:
X-Hub-Signature-256: sha256=<hex hmac of raw body> -
Shopify:
X-Shopify-Hmac-Sha256is base64, not hex — a classic copy-paste trap - Generic: hex HMAC-SHA256 of raw body, if that's what your provider does
Proof, not vibes
I packaged the verifier that implements all four schemes plus a fixture generator — webhook_verify.py --make-fixtures ./fixtures --secret test produces a test set for YOUR endpoint: valid headers for each scheme, an expired timestamp, a bad signature, and a tampered body. Run your endpoint against it before you ship.
Verified behavior: valid fixtures → verified:true exit 0; 407-second-old timestamp → rejected; bad sig → rejected; one-byte body tamper → rejected.
Honest limits: HMAC-SHA256 schemes only — not RSA-signed enterprise providers, JWT-embedded signatures, or mTLS. And the manual layer still matters: read the raw body (not re-serialized), make event handling idempotent, and decide your failure policy before an attacker tests it for you.
$16, stdlib-only Python, fixtures included:
https://wesleygitari2-cloud.github.io/nexus-store-redirect/p/webhook-verify-kit
What does your webhook endpoint do when verification fails — reject silently, log, or alert?
Originally published by Dev.to Security. Aggregated on AIWithGhost for educational purposes — full credit and traffic to the original publisher.