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MORE Markets Exploit: Liquidation Bug Drains $308K

Originally published at MORE Markets Exploit: Liquidation Bug Drains $308K On 16 November 2026, beginning at 17:30 UTC, MORE Markets, a lending protocol on Flow EVM, was exploited through a bug in how its contracts hand

Originally published at MORE Markets Exploit: Liquidation Bug Drains $308K

On 16 November 2026, beginning at 17:30 UTC, MORE Markets, a lending protocol on Flow EVM, was exploited through a bug in how its contracts handled liquidations. The Flow Foundation said an attacker used flash loans to open and then liquidate their own positions in the protocol's ankrFLOW/WFLOW market, and that those liquidations cleared the collateral without clearing the matching WFLOW debt. The leftover, unbacked debt was then used to withdraw WFLOW from the reserve.

Blockaid, which disclosed the incident at 17:47 UTC, reported that about $308,000 had been drained from the WFLOW reserve across roughly 10 transactions. DefiLlama records the same dollar figure. MORE and the Flow Foundation have not published an official loss amount. Independently, we checked the mFlowWFLOW reserve: its WFLOW balance fell from 18,629,353 WFLOW to zero between 17:30:15 and 17:41:58 UTC. The attacker address published by Blockaid received 14,089,553 WFLOW across 11 transactions in that window.

This is a defensive account of a public incident, not a reconstruction of how to repeat it. It is also a different event from the 31 August 2026 drain of the same reserve, which Flow attributed to an Ankr mint bug rather than to MORE's own logic.

What Happened

MORE Markets is a money market on Flow EVM. Suppliers deposit assets such as WFLOW, the wrapped form of FLOW, and borrowers post collateral. The market involved here paired ankrFLOW β€” Ankr's staked FLOW token β€” with WFLOW, and was configured in efficiency mode (e-mode), which allows a higher loan-to-value for assets whose prices are expected to move together.

After taking flash loans, the attacker opened e-mode positions in that market and liquidated those positions themselves. Flow said that collateral was cleared and the matching WFLOW debt was not. That unbacked debt let WFLOW leave the reserve.

The contract that held suppliers' WFLOW is the mFlowWFLOW token at 0x02BF4bd075c1b7C8D85F54777eaAA3638135c059, which Blockaid labeled the victim vault. Just before the first exploit transaction it held 18,629,352.93 WFLOW; after a final outflow at 17:41:58 UTC, the balance was zero. Blockaid also pointed to the MORE pool contract at 0xbC92aaC2DBBF42215248B5688eB3D3d2b32F2c8d.

The exploiter address Blockaid published, 0xe1eA6F2365215389f9DCd50a51c974313BF6785C, deployed a helper contract at 0x9a8cc604b3534eaa1a8627c1d6f6084857bf2765 at 17:29:49 UTC. Starting 26 seconds later, it called the helper 11 times, receiving 14,089,553.21 WFLOW. The first of those transactions, 0xdf9e3ed4…1d15d8 at 17:30:15 UTC, is the example Blockaid cited and moved 4,547,469 WFLOW. The eleventh completed at 17:37:07 UTC.

The 18.63 million WFLOW that left the vault and the 14.09 million WFLOW that arrived at the exploiter are not the same number. The difference remained in other contracts touched by the liquidations, or moved along paths we have not fully attributed. A separate 273,182 WFLOW left the vault at 17:41:58 UTC to an address that is not the Blockaid exploiter; we do not assign that transfer to the same attacker.

Blockaid's about $308,000 is a contemporaneous estimate of the reserve drain, not an official figure and not a measure of later swap proceeds. Yahoo Finance recorded FLOW opening at $0.01743 on 16 November 2026 (day range $0.01602–$0.01745). At that open, 18.63 million WFLOW is about $325,000 and 14.09 million WFLOW is about $246,000. The $308,000 figure fits the same day if the emptied reserve is valued near $0.0165.

From 17:36:21 UTC, the exploiter sent about 14.08 million WFLOW to the Uniswap v3 WFLOW/PYUSD0 pool at 0x0fdba612fea7a7ad0256687eebf056d81ca63f63. The first swap, 2 million WFLOW, received about 31,975 PYUSD0, implying a price near $0.0160. We have not totaled later proceeds.

How Self-Liquidation Left Unbacked Debt

A lending reserve is safe only while every withdrawable claim is still matched by an asset or by a debt the protocol can actually recover. Liquidation is supposed to keep that pairing intact. Once debt remains on the books without collateral behind it, later withdrawals can be settled from other suppliers' WFLOW. That is the same family of bug we discussed in the Kava Lend interest-index exploit, where an internal number disconnected from the assets in the pool, and in the Moonwell MAMO donation exploit, where a lending market accepted a collateral increase that its supply cap was meant to prevent. The surface differs; the lesson does not: a recorded claim must still be covered.

The snippet below is illustrative, not MORE Markets source, and is not a reproduction of the incident. It only states the invariant a liquidation function should not be able to violate:

// Simplified, illustrative invariant β€” not MORE Markets source.
// A liquidation that releases collateral must also reduce the matching debt.
function liquidationKeepsBooksConsistent(
    uint256 debtBefore,
    uint256 debtAfter,
    uint256 collateralReleased,
    uint256 debtRepaid
) pure {
    require(collateralReleased > 0, "nothing seized");
    require(debtRepaid > 0, "debt must be repaid");
    require(debtAfter < debtBefore, "debt must decrease");
    // Exact ratios are protocol-specific. The point is both sides must move.
}

E-mode makes that invariant more important, not less: a higher loan-to-value is reasonable only while liquidation still closes both sides of a position. Flow said the issue was specific to MORE's contract logic, not a problem in Flow EVM, Cadence, or the Flow protocol, and not a repeat of the August ankrFLOW mint flaw.

We have not seen a line-level patch from MORE, and we are not inferring one from the helper contract. Until a post-mortem appears, the verified facts stop at Flow's description, Blockaid's on-chain pointers, and the balances we checked.

Timeline

Times below are in UTC on 16 November 2026.

  • 17:29:49: The Blockaid exploiter deployed the helper contract in transaction 0xdb8a1c94…0465d689.
  • 17:30:15–17:37:07: Eleven helper calls sent 14,089,553 WFLOW to the exploiter. The reserve began falling from 18,629,353 WFLOW. Flow later placed the start of the attack at about 17:30 UTC, which matches this window.
  • 17:36:21 onward: The exploiter started sending WFLOW to the Uniswap v3 WFLOW/PYUSD0 pool, beginning with 2 million WFLOW for about 31,975 PYUSD0.
  • 17:41:58: The mFlowWFLOW vault's WFLOW balance reached zero.
  • 17:47:13: Blockaid reported about $308,000 drained across roughly 10 transactions, and said the attack was still ongoing. By then the eleven transfers to the exploiter were complete and the vault was already empty. We use the on-chain count of eleven.
  • 17:55–17:59: MORE Markets said it had detected an exploit and was investigating, then that its security council had paused the protocol.
  • 18:26: MORE Markets confirmed that both MORE and the AnkrFLOW protocol had been paused, and that it was working with Ankr on a fix.
  • 22:31: The Flow Foundation posted a statement attributing the incident to a bug in MORE's lending contracts, describing the uncleared WFLOW debt, and saying some exchanges had temporarily paused FLOW deposits and withdrawals as a precaution.
  • 22:37: MORE Markets pointed to that Flow statement and said it was working with the Foundation on a resolution.

Aftermath

MORE Markets paused the protocol, and Ankr paused ankrFLOW as a precaution. Flow said the impact was limited to users who had supplied WFLOW to the MORE Markets ankrFLOW/WFLOW market, that positions cannot be changed while the protocols are paused, and that users do not need to take action right now. It also warned people not to interact with anyone claiming to offer refunds or recovery.

As of 16 November 2026, 23:00 UTC, neither MORE nor Ankr had published a post-mortem, a patched contract, or a reimbursement plan. Flow said further updates would come from MORE Markets and Ankr. Exchange deposit and withdrawal status is controlled by each venue.

This article is technical commentary, not financial advice.

Lessons for Builders

A liquidation must move debt and collateral together. If a function can release collateral, or mark it as seized, without reducing the corresponding debt, the reserve becomes a withdrawal source for an unbacked claim. Invariant tests should include the case where the caller is the borrower.

Self-liquidation is not a special case that can skip accounting. Letting a borrower close their own position, especially inside a flash loan, is a normal path in many money markets. It has to hit the same checks as a third-party liquidation.

E-mode raises the cost of a bookkeeping error. A higher loan-to-value is a throughput decision, not a substitute for solvency checks.

Circuit breakers still matter, and dollar figures need a basis. MORE's security council paused the protocol the same afternoon, and Ankr paused ankrFLOW. By then this market's WFLOW reserve was already empty, but a pause still stops further positions from being opened against leftover state. Reserve balances, attacker receipts, and swap proceeds should be reported separately until the project publishes a figure.

What Users Should Know

If you supplied WFLOW to MORE Markets, especially in the ankrFLOW/WFLOW market, follow updates only from MORE Markets, Ankr, and the Flow Foundation. Treat unsolicited "refund" or "compensation" messages as phishing until those accounts describe a recovery process. Flow's statement that impact is limited to WFLOW suppliers in that market, and that positions cannot be changed while the protocols are paused, is a description of the pause, not a promise that every supplier will be made whole. No official reimbursement plan had been published at the time of writing.

If you hold FLOW and were not a MORE Markets supplier, the published accounts do not say your tokens were taken from those venues. Some exchanges paused FLOW deposits and withdrawals as a precaution; check the venue you use. Do not deposit into MORE Markets or ankrFLOW until the teams have published a fix and confirmed that the affected market is safe to use.

Sources

Closing Thoughts

The MORE Markets loss did not require a new token to be minted, or a failure of Flow EVM itself. A liquidation path that could clear collateral without clearing the matching debt was enough to empty a reserve other users had supplied. If you are building or maintaining a lending protocol, talk to our team or check our audit pricing to have liquidation invariants, self-liquidation paths and e-mode categories reviewed before a flash-loaned close is the first production test of those books.

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