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Loopback Is Not a Trust Boundary for Todoist's HTTP MCP Server

Loopback Is Not a Trust Boundary for Todoist's HTTP MCP Server Local AI tool servers are often treated as safe because they bind to 127.0.0.1. CVE-2026-76807 shows why network location and caller identity are different

Loopback Is Not a Trust Boundary for Todoist's HTTP MCP Server

Local AI tool servers are often treated as safe because they bind to 127.0.0.1. CVE-2026-76807 shows why network location and caller identity are different controls.

What went wrong

Todoist MCP versions through 10.3.2 exposed an optional todoist-mcp-http server. The server accepted browser-origin MCP requests without validating Host or Origin and without requiring a caller secret. DNS rebinding allowed a malicious public website to route its own hostname to the victim's loopback listener.

The server then executed tools with its configured TODOIST_API_KEY. The advisory demonstrated task creation and completion, and describes the wider write surface: updates, deletion, projects, sections, comments, reminders, filters, labels, and assignments. The stdio entrypoint is not browser-reachable and was not affected by this attack path.

Patch and configuration

Upgrade @doist/todoist-mcp to 10.3.3 or later. Stop unnecessary HTTP transport instances and prefer stdio for local agent use. If HTTP mode is required, enforce strict loopback hostnames, explicit allowed origins, and a per-run caller token.

Rebinding protections in an MCP SDK are useful only when the server passes explicit allowed-host and allowed-origin lists. Do not assume that loopback binding enables them automatically.

Event review

Search Todoist activity for tasks, comments, projects, or deletions created through automation without a matching user action. Review logs for MCP requests with unexpected Host or Origin values and for browser sessions that resolved to loopback.

Rotate the Todoist API key if the HTTP server was reachable by an untrusted browser or if anomalous writes occurred. Revoke local bearer tokens that were exposed.

Design rule

Treat every local tool server as an internet-adjacent service when a browser can issue requests to it. Validate the caller, not just the socket address. Keep high-impact write tools behind explicit authorization and preserve an audit trail that names the tool, caller session, and resulting change.

References

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