Kerberos Through the HTTPS Tunnel: Pre-Auth Capture via the KDC Proxy
Remote workers can't always reach a Domain Controller on port 88 — so Microsoft tunnels Kerberos over HTTPS. That tunnel is an attack surface. Remote laptops and branch endpoints rarely have direct access to a Domain Co
Remote workers can't always reach a Domain Controller on port 88 — so Microsoft tunnels Kerberos over HTTPS. That tunnel is an attack surface.
Remote laptops and branch endpoints rarely have direct access to a Domain Controller over Kerberos port 88. Microsoft's answer is the Kerberos Key Distribution Center Proxy Protocol (MS-KKDCP): it wraps Kerberos inside ordinary HTTPS on port 443 so remote machines can still authenticate to internal Active Directory.
For red teamers, that's a fascinating surface. A tool built specifically for it:
EvilKDC by cbev0x — https://github.com/cbev0x/EvilKDC
It stands up a rogue KDC over the Windows KDC Proxy, with a scoped DNS responder, a CLDAP responder, and a Kerberos pre-authentication capture engine.
How pre-auth capture works
1. The normal flow. A Windows client needs a Ticket Granting Ticket, so it sends an AS-REQ. With pre-authentication enforced, it encrypts a timestamp with the user's password-derived key to prove identity before the DC returns an AS-REP.
2. The tunnel. When direct UDP/TCP to the DC is blocked, the client encapsulates those Kerberos packets inside an HTTPS POST to the configured KDC Proxy.
3. The rogue responder. Positioned via DNS spoofing, WPAD or proxy injection, EvilKDC answers that proxy connection. When the client sends the AS-REQ with its encrypted pre-auth timestamp, EvilKDC:
- captures the encrypted timestamp and salt,
- formats it as a hashcat
krb5pa(Type 23) hash, - lets the team crack it offline — with no failed logons or lockouts on the real DC.
How blue teams defend it
- Pin the proxy with enterprise PKI so clients reject a rogue endpoint.
- Alert on anomalous AS-REQ spikes — bursts of failed pre-auth from one origin.
- Kill offline cracking at the source. Pre-auth hashes only matter if the password is weak. 16+ character passphrases or FIDO2 keys neutralize the whole attack.
Have you tested or defended MS-KKDCP in your estate? Let's talk below.
Originally published by Dev.to Security. Aggregated on AIWithGhost for educational purposes — full credit and traffic to the original publisher.