Is This IP a VPN, Proxy or Tor? How to Check It (and Name the Provider) for Free
When a fraud complaint, a phishing log or a platform's login history gives you an IP address, the first question is whether that address belongs to a real subscriber connection or to something that hides one β a commerci
When a fraud complaint, a phishing log or a platform's login history gives you an IP address, the first question is whether that address belongs to a real subscriber connection or to something that hides one β a commercial VPN, a Tor exit node or a rented server. The answer decides who holds the next record: a telecom operator in India, a VPN company that may be abroad, or nobody at all.
Short answer: Check the IP against the server lists VPN providers publish and the Tor Project's relay list β a match names the service. If nothing matches, look at who owns the network: hosting and cloud networks are a strong indicator of a VPN, proxy or bot. The free IGRS VPN & Tor IP Checker does the matching for up to 1,000 IPs at once, and the IGRS IP Lookup shows the network owner, ASN, WHOIS range and abuse contact.
1. The five signals, from strongest to weakest
| Signal | Where it comes from | Strength |
|---|---|---|
| IP is in a VPN provider's published server list | Provider's own server data (collected daily by open-source-vpn-ip-lists) | Confirmed β names the provider |
| IP is a Tor relay with the Exit flag | Tor Project's Onionoo directory | Confirmed β Tor exit |
| Network owner is a hosting, cloud or datacenter company | ASN holder and WHOIS records (RIPEstat) | Indicator β VPN, proxy, bot or server |
| Reverse DNS or network name contains βvpnβ, βproxyβ or a server naming pattern | DNS PTR record, WHOIS netname | Indicator |
| Location or time zone does not fit the rest of the evidence | Geolocation databases, device time zone, language settings | Weak on its own β corroborate |
Only the first two are first-party facts. The rest are reasoned indicators and should be written up as such. A clean result proves nothing: lists cover the major providers only, fleets change daily, and residential-proxy services route traffic through ordinary home connections that no list can flag.
2. What real results look like
IGRS ran these public infrastructure addresses through its own tools on 17 November 2026:
| IP | List match | Network (ASN / registry) | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2.56.190.2 | NordVPN server list | AS62240; WHOIS netname PACKETHUB-20210602-DAL; Dallas, US | NordVPN server running on rented datacenter capacity |
| 23.144.160.67 | Mullvad server list | AS32727 (SB Professional Services), US | Mullvad server; the network name alone would not reveal it |
| 204.8.96.153 | Tor exit (Onionoo) | AS62744 (Quintex Alliance Consulting), US | Tor exit relay β the operator cannot identify users |
| 49.36.0.1 | None | AS55836 Reliance Jio Infocomm, Mumbai | Indian telecom range β subscriber records sit with the operator |
Analysis: In the Mullvad example the hosting network's name gives no hint of a VPN, so a check based only on network type would have called it βdatacenterβ at best. The provider-published list is what turns an indicator into a named service. That is why IGRS reports list matches as CONFIRMED and network-type signals as INDICATOR.
3. The βIndiaβ VPN location trap
CERT-In's directions of 28 April 2022 require VPN service providers to register and keep subscriber details β including names, contact details, the purpose of use and the IP addresses allotted β for five years. In June 2022 several large providers responded by removing their physical servers from India: ExpressVPN said its Indian IP addresses would be served from βvirtualβ servers in Singapore and the UK, Surfshark announced it was shutting its Indian servers, and NordVPN said its Indian servers would stay active only until 26 June 2022.
Two consequences for investigators:
- A VPN IP that geolocates to India may be served from another country. Treat its location as unknown until the provider confirms it.
- Records about the user, if any exist, may be held outside India. That means a request to the provider, or a letter of request under S.112 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, rather than a domestic notice to an Indian operator.
4. Workflow: from an IP in a log to the next record
| Step | Action | Tool or provision |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Record the IP, source port and exact timestamp with time zone exactly as the platform gave them | Case diary; preserve the original export |
| 2 | Bulk-check every IP in the export for VPN and Tor matches; export the CSV | VPN & Tor IP Checker |
| 3 | Look up the network owner, ASN, WHOIS range and abuse contact for the remaining IPs; download the report with its SHA-256 hash | IP & ISP Lookup |
| 4 | Indian ISP or telecom: seek subscriber details for IP + port + time | S.94 BNSS 2023 notice through the nodal officer |
| 5 | Hosting company: seek customer, payment and access records for that server | S.94 BNSS 2023 (India) or a request to the foreign provider |
| 6 | VPN or Tor: shift weight to account, device, payment and behavioural evidence | Platform records, UPI/bank trail, device identifiers |
| 7 | Produce electronic records with a certificate | S.63 BSA 2023 |
To see the full server fleet a provider publishes β for blocklists, log correlation or checking a historical address against today's list β use the VPN Server IP Lists page, which covers NordVPN, Proton VPN, Mullvad, Private Internet Access, Surfshark, Windscribe, AirVPN, IVPN, OVPN and RiseupVPN.
5. Legal position in India
| Provision | Relevance |
|---|---|
| CERT-In Directions, 28 April 2022 (under S.70B IT Act 2000) | VPN, VPS, cloud and datacenter providers keep subscriber details for five years; service providers keep ICT logs for 180 days |
| S.94 BNSS 2023 | Summons to produce documents and electronic records from providers in India |
| S.112 BNSS 2023 | Letter of request for investigation in a country outside India |
| S.63 BSA 2023 | Certificate for electronic records, including tool reports and platform exports |
| S.66C / S.66D IT Act 2000 | Identity theft and cheating by personation using a computer resource β common in cases where VPNs are used |
| S.318 / S.319 BNS 2023 | Cheating and cheating by personation |
Using a VPN is not an offence. A VPN or Tor result tells you where the IP trail ends; the case is built on what else the evidence shows.
Originally published on IGRS β Intel Grid Research Station, a free OSINT and cyber-investigation resource for Indian investigators. The tools mentioned β IP & ISP Lookup, VPN & Tor IP Checker and VPN Server IP Lists β are free, need no API key, and run in your browser. The engine (iplookup.js) is MIT-licensed. I'm Manuj Kumar Pandey, an OSINT and digital forensics investigator and founder of Dunime Technologies.
Originally published by Dev.to Security. Aggregated on AIWithGhost for educational purposes β full credit and traffic to the original publisher.