Dev.to Security πŸ” Cybersecurity πŸ‘ 0 πŸ“– 3 min read

I traced a $92,000 Solana drain in 10 minutes. The signer told me everything.

Yesterday someone posted on X that their Ledger had been drained for 1,300 SOL (about $92,000) and asked if anyone could help. I can't get anyone's money back, and neither can the "recovery experts" who show up in the re

Yesterday someone posted on X that their Ledger had been drained for 1,300 SOL (about $92,000) and asked if anyone could help. I can't get anyone's money back, and neither can the "recovery experts" who show up in the replies. What I can do is read the chain, so here's exactly what happened, using only public on-chain data. You can do the same with any drained wallet.

1. Find the transaction that emptied it

The wallet's history is boring for weeks, then this:

When (US Central) What
Nov 13, 8:39 PM Last normal activity: the owner sends 51,992 USDC to a wallet that had funded them before
Nov 14, 2:15:46 PM 1,299.998 SOL leaves for a brand-new wallet, CpWsGt…inMtRG
Nov 14, 2:15:46 PM (same second) The wallet's USDC account is emptied to the same address
Nov 14, 2:45 PM That new wallet sends all 1,299.99 SOL into a vault controlled by a program

Two transactions in the same second is a script, not a person tapping "send".

2. Look at who signed it (this is the whole answer)

Open the drain transaction and look at the signers. There is exactly one: the victim's own wallet, and it paid its own fee.

That rules out most of the scary explanations:

  • Not a malicious token approval. An approval drain is signed by the attacker using a delegate permission. Here the victim's key signed. Revoking approvals would not have helped.
  • Not address poisoning. More on that below.
  • Not a smart-contract bug. It's a plain System Program transfer.

On Solana, "signed by your own key" means one of two things: you approved it, or someone has your secret recovery phrase. With a hardware wallet, the private key never leaves the device, so the usual story is that the 24 words were typed into a fake "Ledger Live" app or site, saved as a photo, or stored in a cloud note. The chain can't tell those apart. It can only tell you the key was used.

3. The poisoning dust was a red herring

The wallet's history was full of tiny incoming transfers (0.000001 SOL, 0.0001 USDC) from addresses like 6JwuCs…AzrD and 7jtjqe…xbH4. They start and end with the same characters as addresses the owner really paid (6JwuBk…AzrD, 7jtj5G…xbH4). That's address poisoning: the attacker hopes you'll copy the lookalike from your history next time you send.

So I checked every outgoing payment: the owner never sent a single lamport to a lookalike. Every real payment went to the real address. Even the drainer's new wallet got poisoned within two minutes (lookalikes of CpWsGt… and 6pgK… showed up right away). The bots dust everything that moves.

Dust can't take anything from you. It's bait. It only costs you money if you copy the wrong address later.

4. Follow the money one hop

The receiving wallet held the SOL for 30 minutes, then sent it to an address owned by a program. The vault behaves like a cross-chain bridge or swap service: several deposits per second, memos carrying 0x… hashes, and its balance had dropped from 2,190 to 892 SOL by the next day. The money has very likely left Solana. The people who run that service are the only realistic lead, which is why a police report with the transaction links matters.

What I'd tell anyone in this spot

  1. Treat the recovery phrase as burned. Make a brand-new wallet with a new phrase. Never reuse the old one, not even on a new device.
  2. Report it (ic3.gov in the US) with the Solscan links. Keep the trail.
  3. Ignore anyone offering recovery for a fee. Every one of those DMs is a second scam. Nobody can reverse a signed Solana transaction.
  4. Next time, before typing your 24 words anywhere, stop. The only place they belong is the hardware wallet itself, when restoring it.

The tool I used

I built a free checker for exactly this: paste a wallet (or a transaction link) into Drain Check and it shows where the money went, who signed each step, and whether any lookalike addresses are poisoning the history. It's powered by Solana Pulse, the open-source safety API I'm building for AI agents and people, and every fact on the page comes from on-chain data with a link to check it.

If you've been drained and want a second pair of eyes, ask in the comments. I'll never ask for your phrase, your keys or any money.

πŸ“° Read the original article on Dev.to Security

Originally published by Dev.to Security. Aggregated on AIWithGhost for educational purposes β€” full credit and traffic to the original publisher.