Dev.to Security πŸ” Cybersecurity πŸ‘ 0 πŸ“– 1 min read

Frozen, then shared: one outside key in 40 USDT-frozen TRON wallets

Originally published on freezecheck.org. Written with AI assistance; every number comes from the published dataset and can be re-checked with the scripts in the package. A Tether freeze blacklists an address in the USDT

Originally published on freezecheck.org. Written with AI assistance; every number comes from the published dataset and can be re-checked with the scripts in the package.

A Tether freeze blacklists an address in the USDT contract: the address can no longer send USDT, but it keeps its own TRON account permissions, and the owner can still change them. We looked at what happens to those permissions after the freeze and found one narrow, well-defined pattern.

What we found

  • One outside key, which we call K-1 (TDDCoDCftE4S1j8iqFtuYrcQY8EGtw6bqp), was added to the owner permission of 40 USDT-frozen wallets.
  • In all 40 cases the addition came after the freeze: 46.3 to 901.5 days later, median 442.4 days.
  • At the snapshot (block 88,163,045) K-1 was still an owner key in 38 wallets. Current schemes: 2-of-2 Γ—35, 3-of-3 Γ—2, 4-of-4 Γ—1. These 38 wallets held 54,799,048.91 USDT, and all 40 were still blacklisted.
  • We re-downloaded all 95 AccountPermissionUpdate transactions of these wallets, recomputed every txID and recovered all 134 secp256k1 signers with two independent implementations. All 95 matched. K-1 signed 10 of them, in 8 wallets, and never signed its own addition.

What it does not show

The data show a shared configured signer, added after the freeze, with verified signatures. They do not show who controls K-1 or the wallets, and they do not show common ownership. This is not an accusation against any person or service. There has been no independent external review yet.

Check it yourself

The package has the dataset (CSV/JSON), methodology, source register and scripts that re-check everything against a public TRON node (no API key) in about three minutes: freeze events, ordering, current blacklist status, signatures, and a simulation of the contract rule (a transfer to a frozen address succeeds, a transfer from it reverts).

Corrections and questions are welcome in the comments or at [email protected].

Temo, FreezeCheck

πŸ“° Read the original article on Dev.to Security

Originally published by Dev.to Security. Aggregated on AIWithGhost for educational purposes β€” full credit and traffic to the original publisher.