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Fake banking apps on WhatsApp: how Delhi Police tied 22 arrests to 22,139 victims

A five-day operation across four states led to 22 arrests, including alleged malware developers. Here is how the fake bank apps worked, the warning signs, and what victims and investigators should do. Delhi Police say a

A five-day operation across four states led to 22 arrests, including alleged malware developers. Here is how the fake bank apps worked, the warning signs, and what victims and investigators should do.

Delhi Police say a five-day operation against fake banking apps has led to 22 arrests, including people accused of building the malware, and linked the accused to 22,139 victims across India. The case was flagged in this morning's India Cyber Brief. This deep dive explains how the scheme is said to have worked, the warning signs, and what victims and investigators should do.

What happened

According to a PTI report carried by ThePrint on 21 November 2026, the Cyber Police Station of Delhi Police's West District ran raids between 11 and 15 November across Jharkhand, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal and Bihar. Teams went to Jamtara, Deoghar and Giridih, among other places, and worked with Jharkhand and Bihar police. Seven special teams with 64 personnel took part.

Police linked the 22 accused to 11 cyber fraud groups, 2,080 complaints on the National Cybercrime Reporting Portal (NCRP) and proceeds of more than Rs 20 crore. The investigation began with an analysis of more than 1,000 complaints of bank account takeovers and APK fraud, along with over 20 e-FIRs. Two cases were registered at the Cyber West police station under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS). Police did not publish the section numbers.

Investigators examined 32 malicious APK files and scrutinised 56 suspected Telegram profiles and the WhatsApp numbers linked to them. They recovered 63 mobile phones, two laptops, two MacBooks and a tablet, which are being examined. DCP (West) Hareshwar Swami was the officer quoted on the case.

Police also cited NCRP data for Delhi: APK fraud complaints fell from 1,406 between 2 and 10 November to 724 between 11 and 17 November, a drop of more than 48 per cent. The420.in rightly notes that the figures alone do not prove the arrests caused the fall.

How the scam is said to work

The accused allegedly posed as bank staff and mainly targeted senior citizens. The lures were everyday tasks that sound official: life certificate verification for pensioners, KYC updates, a new credit card, a higher credit limit, or updating an electricity or gas connection. Victims were then persuaded over WhatsApp to install an APK file to "complete" the verification.

Once installed, the app showed fake banking forms. PTI reports that it sought personal details, banking credentials, SMS messages, OTPs, call records and gallery contents, and that the accused used the permissions victims had granted to take over bank accounts and use up credit card limits. The420.in reports that the money was moved by buying gift coupons from Flipkart, Amazon, Swiggy and BigBasket, which were then sold on Telegram at about a 20 per cent discount, along with purchases of mobile phones and silver coins.

Police have not published a technical breakdown of the 32 APKs. Earlier public research on this family of Indian banking trojans helps fill the picture. Microsoft Threat Intelligence described in 2023 how apps sent over WhatsApp and Telegram impersonated banks and government services, asked users to enable SMS permissions, collected card numbers, CVVs, PINs and PAN details, and sent intercepted SMS messages, including OTPs, to attacker servers. Some samples hid their icon after installation.

Analysis: The scheme does not need a software vulnerability. It needs the victim to do three things: trust a caller, install a file from outside the Play Store, and grant SMS and other permissions. Each of those is a point where a family member, a bank or a phone setting can stop it. The coupon route is also worth noting: it turns stolen card limits into resaleable credit quickly and keeps the money away from the accused's own accounts.

Red flags for users

  • A call or WhatsApp message from someone claiming to be from your bank, asking you to update KYC, renew a life certificate or raise your card limit.
  • Any file ending in .apk sent over WhatsApp, Telegram or SMS, whatever its name. I4C's Cyber Dost alerts have stressed that the government does not send APK files over WhatsApp, and banks such as UCO Bank give the same advice.
  • Your phone asks you to allow "Install unknown apps" for WhatsApp, a browser or a file manager.
  • A newly installed app asks to read and send SMS, see call logs or access photos, or asks for your card PIN, CVV or net-banking password inside a form.
  • An app icon that disappears after installation, or OTP messages you never receive although you expected them.

What to do: ordinary users

  1. Do not install apps from links or files. Banking and government apps come only from the Google Play Store or Apple App Store, from the bank's verified publisher.
  2. Keep "Install unknown apps" switched off for WhatsApp, Telegram, browsers and file managers. Turn off WhatsApp media auto-download for unknown contacts.
  3. If a "bank official" calls, hang up and call the number printed on your card or passbook. Banks do not need an APK to update KYC or a life certificate.
  4. If you installed such an app, switch on flight mode at once, then from another phone call your bank to block cards and net banking, and call 1930 or report at cybercrime.gov.in. Speed matters, because funds can be put on hold only while they are still traceable.
  5. Uninstall the app (check Settings, Apps for unfamiliar names), revoke its permissions, change your banking passwords and UPI PIN from a clean device, and keep the APK file and WhatsApp chat as evidence rather than deleting them.
  6. Report the sender's number on the Chakshu facility of the Sanchar Saathi portal, and check whether your email appears in known breaches with IGRS Breach Check.
  7. Talk to older relatives. They are the main target here, and a simple rule ("no app files from anyone, ever") blocks this whole attack.

What to do: investigators

  1. Preserve the victim's handset and the APK file. Record the hash (SHA-256) of the file and the WhatsApp chat export before analysis, and document the chain of custody.
  2. Analyse the APK in an isolated lab environment: declared permissions (SMS read, receive and send are the key signal), the package name and signing certificate, and any hard-coded server addresses or phone numbers used for exfiltration. Matching signing certificates across samples can link apparently separate groups.
  3. Look up exfiltration domains and server IPs with IP Lookup and VPN/IP Checker to identify the hosting provider, then send preservation and production requests.
  4. Use S.94 BNSS notices to obtain from banks the beneficiary trail, from WhatsApp and Telegram the account details for the numbers and profiles used, and from telecom operators the subscriber and location records for the SIMs.
  5. Follow the coupon trail. Gift card and voucher purchases leave order IDs, delivery addresses, device IDs and redemption records with e-commerce platforms; request these quickly before retention periods lapse.
  6. Cross-check the victim's case on NCRP for linked complaints. In this case police tied 2,080 complaints to the accused, which shows how one APK can sit behind many FIRs in different states.
  7. For any electronic record you produce in court, obtain the certificate required under S.63 BSA.

Applicable law

Provision What it covers Relevance here
S.318 BNS (formerly S.420 IPC) Cheating Inducing victims to install the app and part with credentials and money
S.319 BNS Cheating by personation Posing as bank officials
S.61 BNS Criminal conspiracy Organised groups with developers, callers and money handlers
S.66C IT Act Identity theft (passwords, unique identification features) Use of stolen banking credentials and OTPs
S.66D IT Act Cheating by personation using a computer resource Fake bank forms and messages delivered through the app
S.43 and S.66 IT Act Unauthorised access, damage and computer-related offences Malware reading SMS, call logs and gallery data
S.94 BNSS Summons to produce documents or records Records from banks, platforms, telecom operators and e-commerce firms
S.63 BSA Admissibility of electronic records (certificate) Device extractions, APK analysis and platform records
DPDP Act 2023 Duties of data fiduciaries on personal data Analysis: relevant if any leaked customer lists were used to pick targets

Police said the cases were registered under BNS provisions without naming them; the table above is our reading of the sections that typically apply to this pattern, not the FIR text.

The bigger picture

This is not a one-off. In September 2026, Jharkhand Police reported separate arrests in Deoghar and Jamtara of people accused of sending fake APKs dressed up as RTO e-challans, PM-Kisan documents, electricity bills and gas bill updates. In February 2026, I4C warned government employees about APKs offering to calculate 8th Pay Commission salaries. The lures change with the news, but the method stays the same.

Analysis: Takedowns help, as the drop in Delhi complaints suggests, but the cheapest control is on the phone. Banks, telecom operators and families pushing one message, never install an app from a file, would remove the step this entire operation depended on.

Sources

Originally published on IGRS — Intel Grid Research Station. Free OSINT tools and investigation guides for India: igrs.xyz.

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