CVE-2026-77597: CVE-2026-77597: Blind Server-Side Request Forgery in iSponsorBlockTV DIAL Discovery
CVE-2026-77597: Blind Server-Side Request Forgery in iSponsorBlockTV DIAL Discovery Vulnerability ID: CVE-2026-77597 CVSS Score: 3.5 Published: 2026-11-19 iSponsorBlockTV prior to version 2.11.0 contains a blind Ser
CVE-2026-77597: Blind Server-Side Request Forgery in iSponsorBlockTV DIAL Discovery
Vulnerability ID: CVE-2026-77597
CVSS Score: 3.5
Published: 2026-11-19
iSponsorBlockTV prior to version 2.11.0 contains a blind Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in its Simple Service Discovery Protocol (SSDP) and Discovery and Launch (DIAL) client implementation. During local device discovery, the application processes SSDP responses without validating that the URL specified in the LOCATION header or the subsequent application-url response header matches the IP address of the responding UDP host. An adjacent network attacker can spoof SSDP responses to induce the iSponsorBlockTV host to send arbitrary HTTP GET requests and constrained HTTP POST requests to internal network endpoints or loopback services.
TL;DR
An adjacent network attacker can respond to SSDP M-SEARCH broadcasts from iSponsorBlockTV (versions < 2.11.0) with a crafted LOCATION header, triggering blind HTTP GET and constrained POST requests from the application host to arbitrary internal or loopback addresses.
Technical Details
- Weakness Class: CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (Blind SSRF)
- Attack Vector: Adjacent Network (SSDP/UDP Response Spoofing)
- CVSS v3.1 Score: 3.5 (Low) - CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
- EPSS Score: 0.16% (5.10th Percentile)
- Affected Component: src/iSponsorBlockTV/dial_client.py (find_youtube_app)
- Security Impact: Blind HTTP GET and constrained POST requests to internal/loopback endpoints
- Exploit Status: No Known Public Exploits
- CISA KEV Status: Not Listed
Affected Systems
- iSponsorBlockTV < 2.11.0
-
iSponsorBlockTV: < 2.11.0 (v2.0.8 through v2.10.0) (Fixed in:
2.11.0)
Code Analysis
Commit: 7d31511
Primary patch enforcing IP matching on DIAL LOCATION and application-url headers and disabling HTTP redirects in dial_client.py
--- a/src/iSponsorBlockTV/dial_client.py
+++ b/src/iSponsorBlockTV/dial_client.py
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
"""Send out an M-SEARCH request and listening for responses."""
import asyncio
+import ipaddress
import logging
import secrets
import socket
@@ -81,7 +82,7 @@ def get_ip() -> str:
class Handler(ssdp.aio.SSDP):
def __init__(self):
super().__init__()
- self.devices_queue: asyncio.Queue[str] = asyncio.Queue()
+ self.devices_queue: asyncio.Queue[Tuple[str, str]] = asyncio.Queue()
def clear(self):
self.devices_queue = asyncio.Queue()
@@ -93,7 +94,7 @@ def response_received(self, response: ssdp.messages.SSDPResponse, addr):
headers = response.headers
headers = {k.lower(): v for k, v in headers}
if "location" in headers:
- self.devices_queue.put_nowait(headers["location"])
+ self.devices_queue.put_nowait((headers["location"], addr[0]))
def request_received(self, request: ssdp.messages.SSDPRequest, addr):
raise NotImplementedError("Request received is not implemented, this is a client")
@@ -113,33 +114,64 @@ def _generate_pairing_code() -> str:
return "".join(str(secrets.randbelow(10)) for _ in range(12))
+def _url_matches_ip(url: str, expected_ip: str) -> bool:
+ """Return whether a DIAL URL points back to the SSDP responder."""
+ try:
+ parsed_url = URL(url)
+ url_ip = ipaddress.ip_address(parsed_url.host or "")
+ sender_ip = ipaddress.ip_address(expected_ip)
+ except ValueError:
+ return False
+
+ return url_ip == sender_ip
+
+
async def find_youtube_app(
- web_session: ClientSession, api_helper: "ApiHelper", url_location: str, active: bool = True
+ web_session: ClientSession,
+ api_helper: "ApiHelper",
+ url_location: str,
+ expected_ip: str,
+ active: bool = True,
) -> Optional[Dict[str, Any]]:
"""Discover and validate a YouTube app on a DIAL device.
Args:
web_session: aiohttp ClientSession for making requests
api_helper: API helper instance for pairing operations
url_location: Device location URL from DIAL discovery
+ expected_ip: IP address of the SSDP response sender
active: If True, attempt to launch YouTube app to obtain screen ID.
If False, only try passive methods (direct service query).
Returns:
Device dict with screen_id, name, and offset, or None if not found/invalid.
"""
- async with web_session.get(url_location) as response:
+ if not _url_matches_ip(url_location, expected_ip):
+ logger.debug(
+ "Ignoring DIAL LOCATION from %s with non-matching URL %s", expected_ip, url_location
+ )
+ return None
+
+ async with web_session.get(url_location, allow_redirects=False) as response:
headers = response.headers
response = await response.text()
data = xmltodict.parse(response)
name = data["root"]["device"]["friendlyName"]
app_url = headers["application-url"]
+ if not _url_matches_ip(app_url, expected_ip):
+ logger.debug(
+ "Ignoring DIAL application-url from %s with non-matching URL %s", expected_ip, app_url
+ )
+ return None
+
base_url = URL(app_url)
youtube_url = str(base_url / "YouTube")
request_headers = {"Origin": "https://www.youtube.com"}
try:
- async with web_session.get(youtube_url, headers=request_headers) as response:
+ async with web_session.get(
+ youtube_url, headers=request_headers, allow_redirects=False
+ ) as response:
youtube_service_xml = await response.text()
screen_id = _extract_screen_id(youtube_service_xml)
if screen_id:
@@ -161,7 +193,9 @@ async def find_youtube_app(
}
launch_data = {"pairingCode": pairing_code, "theme": "cl"}
- async with web_session.post(youtube_url, headers=launch_headers, data=launch_data) as response:
+ async with web_session.post(
+ youtube_url, headers=launch_headers, data=launch_data, allow_redirects=False
+ ) as response:
if response.headers.get("Location"):
logger.debug("Launched YouTube app on %s, waiting for it to pair...", name)
for _ in range(10):
@@ -223,13 +257,17 @@ async def _process_devices(
):
try:
# Try to get a device from the queue with timeout
- url_location = await asyncio.wait_for(handler.devices_queue.get(), timeout=0.5)
+ url_location, expected_ip = await asyncio.wait_for(
+ handler.devices_queue.get(), timeout=0.5
+ )
# Always create a task - we'll deduplicate by screen_id after we have it
logger.debug("Discovered device at %s, processing...", url_location)
- coro = find_youtube_app(web_session, api_helper, url_location, active=active)
+ coro = find_youtube_app(
+ web_session, api_helper, url_location, expected_ip, active=active
+ )
task = asyncio.create_task(coro)
pending_tasks.add(task)
- except asyncio.TimeoutError:
+ except TimeoutError:
pass
except Exception:
pass
Commit: 841843a
Merge commit integrating the DIAL SSRF fix into main branch
Commit: 005d248
Release version bump commit for v2.11.0
Mitigation Strategies
- Upgrade iSponsorBlockTV to version 2.11.0 or later to enforce UDP sender IP verification and disable HTTP redirects during DIAL discovery.
- Pair YouTube TV devices manually using a TV pairing code or static screen_id in config.json rather than executing SSDP multicast discovery on shared local networks.
- Isolate the iSponsorBlockTV service inside a non-host-networked container after initial setup so it cannot reach host loopback (127.0.0.1) services.
Remediation Steps:
- Update the Python package via pip (
pip install --upgrade 'iSponsorBlockTV>=2.11.0') or pull the latest container image (ghcr.io/dmunozv04/isponsorblocktv:v2.11.0). - Restart the iSponsorBlockTV daemon or container service to ensure the patched dial_client.py module is loaded into memory.
- Verify that no unauthorized devices or unrecognized screen_id entries were added to the application configuration file during previous discovery cycles.
References
- GitHub Security Advisory: GHSA-56v3-jrq2-4q9m
- Primary Patch Commit (7d315115f41523632588fb0b22d46d85807172b7)
- Merge Commit (841843a4dd3b2fd3958e5ece1f32864957caa99b)
- iSponsorBlockTV v2.11.0 Release
- NVD Entry for CVE-2026-77597
- CVE.org Record: CVE-2026-77597
- CVEListV5 JSON Record: CVE-2026-77597
Read the full report for CVE-2026-77597 on our website for more details including interactive diagrams and full exploit analysis.
Originally published by Dev.to Security. Aggregated on AIWithGhost for educational purposes β full credit and traffic to the original publisher.