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CVE-2026-69133: CVE-2026-69133: Cumulation Buffer Memory Retention in Netty OHTTP Codec

CVE-2026-69133: Cumulation Buffer Memory Retention in Netty OHTTP Codec Vulnerability ID: CVE-2026-69133 CVSS Score: 5.3 Published: 2026-11-20 CVE-2026-69133 (GHSA-cg26-4c6j-2x8h) is a missing resource release vulne

CVE-2026-69133: Cumulation Buffer Memory Retention in Netty OHTTP Codec

Vulnerability ID: CVE-2026-69133
CVSS Score: 5.3
Published: 2026-11-20

CVE-2026-69133 (GHSA-cg26-4c6j-2x8h) is a missing resource release vulnerability (CWE-772) in io.netty.incubator:netty-incubator-codec-ohttp affecting versions 0.0.20.Final through 0.0.26.Final. Both OHttpClientCodec and OHttpServerCodec retain the outer cumulationBuffer at its expanded high-water capacity after an Oblivious HTTP (OHTTP) exchange finishes. A remote unauthenticated attacker can complete a large OHTTP request or response over an HTTP keep-alive connection and leave the connection idle, pinning pooled or direct memory allocations across concurrent connections to induce denial of service.

TL;DR

Netty OHTTP client and server codecs fail to release or reset the outer cumulation buffer upon completing an OHTTP exchange. Remote peers can complete a large exchange and keep the connection idle via HTTP keep-alive to pin direct memory and exhaust JVM buffer pools. Upgrade to version 0.0.27.Final to resolve the flaw.

⚠️ Exploit Status: POC

Technical Details

  • CVE / GHSA ID: CVE-2026-69133 / GHSA-cg26-4c6j-2x8h
  • Weakness Class: CWE-772: Missing Release of Resource after Effective Lifetime
  • CVSS v3.1 Score: 5.3 Medium (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L)
  • EPSS Score: 0.30% (23.82nd Percentile)
  • Attack Vector: Network (Unauthenticated HTTP Keep-Alive Connections)
  • Impact: Direct/Pooled Memory Exhaustion (Endpoint Denial of Service)
  • Exploit Status: Proof-of-Concept (Unit Test Reproduction)
  • Patched Version: 0.0.27.Final

Affected Systems

  • io.netty.incubator:netty-incubator-codec-ohttp (0.0.20.Final through 0.0.26.Final)
  • netty-incubator-codec-ohttp: >= 0.0.20.Final, < 0.0.27.Final (Fixed in: 0.0.27.Final)

Code Analysis

Commit: a82cd85

Merge commit from fork: Discard read bytes or release cumulationBuffer as soon as possible after parsing completes.

diff --git a/codec-ohttp/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/ohttp/OHttpClientCodec.java b/codec-ohttp/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/ohttp/OHttpClientCodec.java
index c738cc8..0faeb2d 100644
--- a/codec-ohttp/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/ohttp/OHttpClientCodec.java
+++ b/codec-ohttp/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/ohttp/OHttpClientCodec.java
@@ -245,6 +245,14 @@ protected void decode(ChannelHandlerContext ctx, HttpObject msg, List<Object> ou
                 out.add(ReferenceCountUtil.retain(msg));
             }
             if (isLast) {
+                // Check if we can either free up some memory or release it all together.
+                if (cumulationBuffer.isReadable()) {
+                    cumulationBuffer.discardSomeReadBytes();
+                } else {
+                    cumulationBuffer.release();
+                    cumulationBuffer = Unpooled.EMPTY_BUFFER;
+                }
+
                 OHttpRequestResponseContextHolder h = contextHolders.pollFirst();
                 assert h != null;
                 h.destroy();
diff --git a/codec-ohttp/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/ohttp/OHttpServerCodec.java b/codec-ohttp/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/ohttp/OHttpServerCodec.java
index 23b88d6..b91b66b 100644
--- a/codec-ohttp/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/ohttp/OHttpServerCodec.java
+++ b/codec-ohttp/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/ohttp/OHttpServerCodec.java
@@ -188,6 +188,13 @@ protected final void decode(ChannelHandlerContext ctx, HttpObject msg, List<Obje
                         oHttpContext.parse(ctx.alloc(), cumulationBuffer, isLast, out);
                     } finally {
                         if (isLast && oHttpContext.receivedLastHttpContent()) {
+                            // Check if we can either free up some memory or release it all together.
+                            if (cumulationBuffer.isReadable()) {
+                                cumulationBuffer.discardSomeReadBytes();
+                            } else {
+                                cumulationBuffer.release();
+                                cumulationBuffer = Unpooled.EMPTY_BUFFER;
+                            }
                             destroyContext();
                         }
                     }
@@ -297,7 +304,6 @@ public final void handlerRemoved(ChannelHandlerContext ctx) throws Exception {
             destroyed = true;
             cumulationBuffer.release();
             cumulationBuffer = Unpooled.EMPTY_BUFFER;
-
             destroyContext();
         }
         super.handlerRemoved(ctx);

Exploit Details

  • GitHub: Official GitHub Security Advisory detailing the cumulationBuffer retention mechanics in OHttpClientCodec and OHttpServerCodec.

Mitigation Strategies

  • Upgrade io.netty.incubator:netty-incubator-codec-ohttp to version 0.0.27.Final or later.
  • Configure Netty IdleStateHandler on OHTTP pipelines with short read-idle timeouts to evict idle keep-alive connections.
  • Enforce connection limits per source IP and restrict maximum HTTP keep-alive idle duration at the ingress proxy or load balancer.
  • Monitor JVM direct memory usage and Netty PooledByteBufAllocatorMetric telemetry for buffer retention anomalies.

Remediation Steps:

  1. Audit project dependency trees (e.g., via 'mvn dependency:tree' or 'gradle dependencies') to identify versions of io.netty.incubator:netty-incubator-codec-ohttp between 0.0.20.Final and 0.0.26.Final.
  2. Update the dependency version in pom.xml or build.gradle to 0.0.27.Final.
  3. Rebuild and redeploy affected OHTTP client and gateway applications.
  4. Verify via heap/direct memory telemetry or unit tests (such as OHttpCumulationBufferRetentionTest) that cumulationBuffer refCnt drops to 0 immediately after exchange completion while the channel remains open.

References

Read the full report for CVE-2026-69133 on our website for more details including interactive diagrams and full exploit analysis.

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