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CVE-2026-68903: CVE-2026-68903: Arbitrary Host File Read via Model.spec.source hostPath Injection in LLMKube

CVE-2026-68903: Arbitrary Host File Read via Model.spec.source hostPath Injection in LLMKube Vulnerability ID: CVE-2026-68903 CVSS Score: 7.7 Published: 2026-11-18 LLMKube prior to version 0.9.0 fails to restrict lo

CVE-2026-68903: Arbitrary Host File Read via Model.spec.source hostPath Injection in LLMKube

Vulnerability ID: CVE-2026-68903
CVSS Score: 7.7
Published: 2026-11-18

LLMKube prior to version 0.9.0 fails to restrict local filesystem paths and file:// URIs supplied in the Model.spec.source field of custom resources. A namespace-level user with permission to create or modify Model and InferenceService resources can traverse the filesystem of the operator controller pod or mount arbitrary host node files via a HostPathVolumeSource. This enables unauthorized disclosure of high-privilege Kubernetes ServiceAccount tokens and underlying host credentials.

TL;DR

A path validation vulnerability (CWE-22) in the LLMKube Kubernetes operator allows low-privileged namespace users to read arbitrary files from the controller pod and worker nodes via unvalidated local paths in Model custom resources. Fixed in v0.9.0 by disabling local paths by default and introducing an explicit directory allowlist.

⚠️ Exploit Status: POC

Technical Details

  • Vulnerability Class: CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory
  • CVSS v3.1 Score: 7.7 High (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N)
  • Attack Vector: Network (Kubernetes API Custom Resource Manipulation)
  • Affected Component: LLMKube Operator (ModelReconciler & InferenceServiceReconciler)
  • Primary Impact: Arbitrary file read from controller pod and worker node filesystems
  • Patched Version: v0.9.0
  • CISA KEV Status: Not Listed

Affected Systems

  • defilantech LLMKube Kubernetes Operator
  • LLMKube: < 0.9.0 (Fixed in: 0.9.0)

Code Analysis

Commit: ec2647f

Enforce host-path allowlist for local Model.spec.source paths, normalize URI schemes, and add SSRF protection

func validateLocalSourceAllowed(source string, allowedRoots []string) error {
    if !isLocalSource(source) {
        return nil
    }
    p := getLocalPath(source)
    if !filepath.IsAbs(p) {
        return fmt.Errorf("local model source must be an absolute path: %q", source)
    }
    clean := filepath.Clean(p)
    allowed := false
    for _, root := range allowedRoots {
        if root == "" || !filepath.IsAbs(root) {
            continue
        }
        r := filepath.Clean(root)
        if clean == r || strings.HasPrefix(clean, r+string(filepath.Separator)) {
            allowed = true
            break
        }
    }
    if !allowed {
        if hasNoUsableRoot(allowedRoots) {
            return fmt.Errorf("local/hostPath model sources are disabled: no allowed roots configured "+
                "(set modelSource.allowedHostPathRoots); refusing source %q (GHSA-jw3m-8q7m-f35r)", source)
        }
        return fmt.Errorf("local model source %q is not within any allowed root %v (GHSA-jw3m-8q7m-f35r)", source, allowedRoots)
    }
    return nil
}

Mitigation Strategies

  • Upgrade LLMKube operator and Helm charts to version 0.9.0 or later to disable arbitrary local and hostPath model sources by default.
  • Restrict local model loading to dedicated, read-only host directories using the --allowed-host-path-roots controller flag or modelSource.allowedHostPathRoots Helm value.
  • Enforce Kubernetes ValidatingAdmissionPolicy or OPA Gatekeeper rules blocking file:// and leading slash (/) values in Model.spec.source.
  • Restrict RBAC permissions for creating Model and InferenceService custom resources to trusted users.

Remediation Steps:

  1. Audit all existing Model resources across all namespaces for file:// URIs or absolute file paths using kubectl.
  2. Upgrade the LLMKube installation to v0.9.0 via Helm or manifest deployment.
  3. Verify that modelSource.allowedHostPathRoots is set to an empty array [] unless node-local model storage is strictly required.
  4. Inspect and delete any running InferenceService Deployments and Pods that were created prior to the upgrade with unauthorized hostPath volume mounts.
  5. If anomalous Model resources targeting /var/run/secrets or host paths are discovered during auditing, rotate the LLMKube controller ServiceAccount token and affected node credentials.

References

Read the full report for CVE-2026-68903 on our website for more details including interactive diagrams and full exploit analysis.

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