CVE-2026-62336: CVE-2026-62336: Local Privilege Escalation via Symlink Following in qbee-agent
CVE-2026-62336: Local Privilege Escalation via Symlink Following in qbee-agent Vulnerability ID: CVE-2026-62336 CVSS Score: 8.5 Published: 2026-11-17 CVE-2026-62336 (GHSA-xhv5-8fpq-g7hf) is a high-severity local pri
CVE-2026-62336: Local Privilege Escalation via Symlink Following in qbee-agent
Vulnerability ID: CVE-2026-62336
CVSS Score: 8.5
Published: 2026-11-17
CVE-2026-62336 (GHSA-xhv5-8fpq-g7hf) is a high-severity local privilege escalation, arbitrary file overwrite, and denial-of-service vulnerability in qbee-agent, the client daemon for the qbee.io IoT device management platform. Prior to version 2026.27, the root-privileged agent failed to validate path components against symbolic links during directory creation and file opening operations in app/configuration/file_manager.go. Local unprivileged users can exploit this flaw by planting symlinks in user-controlled configuration paths or predictable temporary staging locations, causing the daemon to overwrite, truncate, or change ownership of sensitive root-owned system files.
TL;DR
An improper link resolution flaw (CWE-59) in qbee-agent prior to version 2026.27 allows local unprivileged attackers to escalate privileges to root or corrupt system files by planting symbolic links in managed directories (such as ~/.ssh) or predictable temporary staging paths (/tmp/.bundle.raucb.part).
⚠️ Exploit Status: POC
Technical Details
- CVE ID: CVE-2026-62336 (GHSA-xhv5-8fpq-g7hf)
- Weakness: CWE-59 (Improper Link Resolution Before File Access)
- Attack Vector: Local (Unprivileged User / Symlink Planting)
- CVSS v4.0: 8.5 High (CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N)
- EPSS Score: 0.10% (0.84th Percentile)
- Impact: Local Privilege Escalation to root, Arbitrary File Overwrite, Denial of Service
- Exploit Status: Proof-of-Concept Available (Unit Test Reproducer)
- CISA KEV Status: Not Listed
Affected Systems
- qbee-io/qbee-agent
-
qbee-agent: < 2026.27 (Fixed in:
2026.27)
Code Analysis
Commit: 0fdf8e4
Enforce syscall.O_NOFOLLOW in createFile and validate ancestor directories with os.Lstat in makeDirectories to prevent CWE-59 symlink traversal.
diff --git a/app/configuration/file_manager.go b/app/configuration/file_manager.go
index acf2b210..d3fca838 100644
--- a/app/configuration/file_manager.go
+++ b/app/configuration/file_manager.go
@@ -491,13 +491,18 @@ func calculateTemplateDigest(src string, params map[string]string) (string, erro
}
// createFile under provided path and with provided uid and gid.
+//
+// The agent typically runs as root, so all path resolution here must refuse
+// to follow attacker-controlled symlinks (CWE-59). makeDirectories rejects
+// symlinked intermediate components; O_NOFOLLOW rejects a symlinked final
+// component so we never open, truncate, or chown an attacker-chosen target.
func createFile(path string, fileCreateData *fileCreateData, permission os.FileMode, truncate bool) (*os.File, error) {
var err error
if err = makeDirectories(path, fileManagerDefaultDirectoryPermission, fileCreateData.uid, fileCreateData.gid); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
- openFlags := os.O_RDWR | os.O_CREATE
+ openFlags := os.O_RDWR | os.O_CREATE | syscall.O_NOFOLLOW
if truncate {
openFlags = openFlags | os.O_TRUNC
@@ -608,6 +613,10 @@ func determineFileCreateData(dst string) (*fileCreateData, error) {
}
// makeDirectories checks if all directories for the dst file exist, if not, create them with provided owner and group.
+//
+// All ancestor components are inspected with os.Lstat so that a symlinked
+// directory (e.g. an attacker's ~/.ssh pointing at /root/.ssh) is rejected
+// rather than transparently traversed by the kernel (CWE-59).
func makeDirectories(dst string, permissions os.FileMode, uid, gid int) error {
if dst == "/" {
return nil
@@ -615,13 +624,14 @@ func makeDirectories(dst string, permissions os.FileMode, uid, gid int) error {
dirPath := filepath.Dir(dst)
- dirInfo, err := os.Stat(dirPath)
- if errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) {
- // ensure parent exists
- if err = makeDirectories(dirPath, permissions, uid, gid); err != nil {
- return err
- }
+ // Always validate / materialize ancestors first so that symlinks higher
+ // up the path are caught even when dirPath itself already exists.
+ if err := makeDirectories(dirPath, permissions, uid, gid); err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+ dirInfo, err := os.Lstat(dirPath)
+ if errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) {
if err = os.Mkdir(dirPath, permissions); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("cannot create directorty %s: %w", dirPath, err)
}
@@ -637,6 +647,10 @@ func makeDirectories(dst string, permissions os.FileMode, uid, gid int) error {
return fmt.Errorf("cannot create directory %s: %w", dirPath, err)
}
+ if dirInfo.Mode()&os.ModeSymlink != 0 {
+ return fmt.Errorf("refusing to traverse symlinked path component %s", dirPath)
+ }
+
if !dirInfo.IsDir() {
return fmt.Errorf("cannot create directory, %s is a file", dirPath)
}
Exploit Details
- GitHub: Official patch commit containing Go unit test reproducers (Test_createFile_doesNotFollowSymlinks) demonstrating both the ~/.ssh intermediate symlink and /tmp/.bundle.raucb.part staging attacks.
Mitigation Strategies
- Upgrade qbee-agent to version 2026.27 or later across all managed IoT endpoints.
- Enable Linux kernel symlink, hardlink, FIFO, and regular file restrictions via sysctl to mitigate predictable /tmp staging attacks.
- Audit and restrict qbee-agent SSH Keys and File Distribution configurations that target directories writable by non-root users.
- Monitor system logs and auditd events for unauthorized symbolic link creation inside user home directories and /tmp.
Remediation Steps:
- Update the qbee-agent package on all affected devices to release 2026.27 (commit 0fdf8e411de5d0c142ae2590cf1c54bdfc2e529a).
- Verify that fs.protected_symlinks=1 and fs.protected_hardlinks=1 are active via 'sysctl -a' on all managed Linux hosts.
- Inspect existing user home directories (e.g., 'find /home -maxdepth 3 -type l -ls') and /tmp for anomalous symbolic links pointing to /root or /etc.
- Restart the qbee-agent service and verify in the agent logs that configuration synchronization completes without symlink traversal errors.
References
- GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-xhv5-8fpq-g7hf
- Official Patch Commit (0fdf8e411de5d0c142ae2590cf1c54bdfc2e529a)
- Pull Request #131: Refuse to follow symlinks in file manager
- qbee-agent Release 2026.27
- CVE-2026-62336 Record on CVE.org
- National Vulnerability Database (NVD) - CVE-2026-62336
Read the full report for CVE-2026-62336 on our website for more details including interactive diagrams and full exploit analysis.
Originally published by Dev.to Security. Aggregated on AIWithGhost for educational purposes — full credit and traffic to the original publisher.