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CVE-2026-129297: CVE-2026-129297: Sender IP Address Spoofing in SpamScope mail-parser

CVE-2026-129297: Sender IP Address Spoofing in SpamScope mail-parser Vulnerability ID: CVE-2026-129297 CVSS Score: 7.5 Published: 2026-11-16 CVE-2026-129297 is an origin validation vulnerability (CWE-345) in the Pyt

CVE-2026-129297: Sender IP Address Spoofing in SpamScope mail-parser

Vulnerability ID: CVE-2026-129297
CVSS Score: 7.5
Published: 2026-11-16

CVE-2026-129297 is an origin validation vulnerability (CWE-345) in the Python library mail-parser prior to version 4.6.2. The MailParser.get_server_ipaddress() method fails to properly isolate MTA-recorded client IP addresses from sender-controlled text within email Received headers. Due to naive substring delimiter matching, appearance-based regular expression scanning, and fail-open header traversal, remote attackers can spoof their originating IP address to bypass email security controls, blocklists, and anti-spam attribution.

TL;DR

SpamScope mail-parser versions prior to 4.6.2 are vulnerable to sender IP spoofing in get_server_ipaddress(). An attacker can craft HELO strings or pre-populate Received headers to force the parser to ignore the legitimate MTA hop and return an arbitrary attacker-chosen IP address. Upgrade to mail-parser 4.6.2 to resolve the issue.

⚠️ Exploit Status: POC

Technical Details

  • Vulnerability ID: CVE-2026-129297 (GHSA-72px-j8gh-p79x)
  • CWE Classification: CWE-345 (Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity)
  • CVSS v3.1 Score: 7.5 HIGH (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N)
  • Affected Component: mailparser.MailParser.get_server_ipaddress() in SpamScope/mail-parser (< 4.6.2)
  • Attack Vector: Network (Crafted SMTP HELO/EHLO strings and forged Received headers)
  • Primary Impact: Sender IP address spoofing, subverting email attribution and IP blocklists/allowlists
  • Exploit Status: Proof-of-Concept (Regression tests public in official repository)
  • Patched Version: mail-parser 4.6.2

Affected Systems

  • SpamScope mail-parser (PyPI package)
  • mail-parser: < 4.6.2 (Fixed in: 4.6.2)

Code Analysis

Commit: ce3cf35

Replace appearance-based IP extraction with positional candidate selection, anchored clause splitting, and fail-closed Received header traversal.

diff --git a/src/mailparser/core.py b/src/mailparser/core.py
--- a/src/mailparser/core.py
+++ b/src/mailparser/core.py
@@ -554,11 +680,19 @@ def get_server_ipaddress(self, trust):

         In our case we trust only our mail server with the trust string.

+        The walk continues only while a trusted hop names a *private* IP,
+        which marks an internal relay.  A trusted hop naming no IP at all
+        ends the search with None: extraction failing there used to
+        drop the loop into older Received headers, which the sender wrote,
+        so every trick that defeats extraction on the genuine hop returned
+        an attacker-chosen IP instead of nothing (CWE-345).
+
         Args:
             trust (string): String that identify our mail server

         Returns:
-            string with the ip address
+            string with the ip address, or None when no trusted hop names
+            a public sender IP
         """
         log.debug(f"Trust string is {trust!r}")

@@ -572,35 +706,115 @@ def get_server_ipaddress(self, trust):

         for i in received:
             i = ported_string(i)
-            if trust in i:
-                log.debug(f"Trust string {trust!r} is in {i!r}")
-                ip_str = self._extract_ip(i)
-                if ip_str:
-                    return ip_str
+            if trust not in i:
+                continue
+
+            log.debug(f"Trust string {trust!r} is in {i!r}")
+            candidates = self._sender_ip_candidates(i)
+            if not candidates:
+                # Nothing to read on an authoritative hop: stop, never fall
+                # through to a header the sender controls.
+                log.debug("Trusted hop names no sender IP, stopping")
+                return None
+
+            ip_str = self._public_ip(candidates)
+            if ip_str:
+                return ip_str
+            # Private IP: an internal relay, keep following the chain.

Exploit Details

  • GitHub: Regression test cases in tests/test_mail_parser.py demonstrating HELO delimiter truncation, header fall-through, and address literal spoofing.

Mitigation Strategies

  • Upgrade mail-parser to version 4.6.2 or later to enforce positional IP extraction and fail-closed header traversal.
  • Cross-reference extracted sender IP addresses with authoritative edge MTA transaction logs before executing automated blocklisting or attribution actions.
  • Configure edge MTAs to strip external Authentication-Results or custom client-IP headers and inject a dedicated, trusted header containing the peer socket IP.

Remediation Steps:

  1. Identify all Python applications, virtual environments, and container images utilizing the mail-parser package.
  2. Update dependency manifests (requirements.txt, Pipfile, pyproject.toml) to pin mail-parser>=4.6.2.
  3. Run 'pip install --upgrade mail-parser>=4.6.2' and redeploy affected email processing services.
  4. Audit historical threat intelligence or blocklist entries generated by get_server_ipaddress() for discrepancies against raw MTA logs.

References

Read the full report for CVE-2026-129297 on our website for more details including interactive diagrams and full exploit analysis.

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