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CVE-2026-128072: CVE-2026-128072: DNS Rebinding and Origin Validation Error in Nuxt Webpack and Rspack Development Builders

CVE-2026-128072: DNS Rebinding and Origin Validation Error in Nuxt Webpack and Rspack Development Builders Vulnerability ID: CVE-2026-128072 CVSS Score: 3.1 Published: 2026-11-16 CVE-2026-128072 (GHSA-x2wv-5868-p7v2

CVE-2026-128072: DNS Rebinding and Origin Validation Error in Nuxt Webpack and Rspack Development Builders

Vulnerability ID: CVE-2026-128072
CVSS Score: 3.1
Published: 2026-11-16

CVE-2026-128072 (GHSA-x2wv-5868-p7v2) is an origin validation vulnerability (CWE-346) in the Nuxt framework affecting the development middleware of @nuxt/webpack-builder and @nuxt/rspack-builder. Prior to version 4.6.4, the internal same-origin verification logic evaluated Sec-Fetch-Site, Origin, and Referer headers without first validating that the HTTP Host header belonged to an authorized hostname allowlist. This flaw allows a remote attacker to execute a DNS rebinding attack against a developer's local workstation, bypassing same-origin protections to read compiled client-side JavaScript chunks, inline source maps, local filesystem paths, and embedded client configuration values.

TL;DR

The development server middleware in @nuxt/webpack-builder (>= 3.0.0, < 4.6.4) and @nuxt/rspack-builder (>= 3.12.2, < 4.6.4) fails to validate the HTTP Host header against an allowlist prior to checking same-origin request headers. An attacker can use DNS rebinding to point an attacker-controlled domain to 127.0.0.1, causing the browser to send matching Host and Origin headers (and Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin) to the local Nuxt development server, exfiltrating client bundles and source maps. Nuxt applications using the default Vite builder and production builds are unaffected. Upgrade to Nuxt 4.6.4 to remediate.

⚠️ Exploit Status: POC

Technical Details

  • Vulnerability ID: CVE-2026-128072 / GHSA-x2wv-5868-p7v2
  • Weakness Class: CWE-346: Origin Validation Error (DNS Rebinding)
  • CVSS v3.1 Score: 3.1 Low (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N)
  • EPSS Score: 0.136% (3.09th Percentile)
  • Affected Components: @nuxt/webpack-builder (< 4.6.4), @nuxt/rspack-builder (< 4.6.4)
  • Impact: Exfiltration of local dev client bundles, source maps, and filesystem paths
  • Exploit Status: Conceptual PoC (DNS Rebinding); Not in CISA KEV
  • Fixed Version: Nuxt 4.6.4

Affected Systems

  • nuxt
  • @nuxt/webpack-builder
  • @nuxt/rspack-builder
  • nuxt: >= 3.0.0, < 4.6.4 (Fixed in: 4.6.4)
  • @nuxt/webpack-builder: >= 3.0.0, < 4.6.4 (Fixed in: 4.6.4)
  • @nuxt/rspack-builder: >= 3.12.2, < 4.6.4 (Fixed in: 4.6.4)

Code Analysis

Commit: f8d64c9

Added isAllowedHost check and required strict Host validation before evaluating Sec-Fetch-Site or Origin/Referer.

--- a/packages/webpack/src/utils/same-origin.ts
+++ b/packages/webpack/src/utils/same-origin.ts
@@ -1,17 +1,48 @@
+import { isIP } from 'node:net'
+
 const LOOPBACK_HOSTNAMES = new Set(['localhost', '127.0.0.1', '::1'])

+interface DevRequest {
+  headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>
+}
+
 function firstHeader (value: string | string[] | undefined): string | undefined {
   return Array.isArray(value) ? value[0] : value
 }

+function parseHostname (host: string): string | undefined {
+  const value = host.trim().toLowerCase()
+  if (value.startsWith('[')) {
+    const end = value.indexOf(']')
+    return end > 1 ? value.slice(1, end) : undefined
+  }
+  return value.split(':')[0] || undefined
+}
+
 function isLoopbackHost (host: string | undefined): boolean {
-  if (!host) { return false }
-  const withoutPort = host.replace(/:\d+$/, '')
-  const hostname = withoutPort.replace(/^\[|\]$/g, '').toLowerCase()
-  return LOOPBACK_HOSTNAMES.has(hostname)
+  const hostname = host && parseHostname(host)
+  return !!hostname && LOOPBACK_HOSTNAMES.has(hostname)
 }

-export function isSameOriginRequest (req: { headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined> }): boolean {
+export function isAllowedHost (host: string | undefined, allowedHosts: readonly string[] | true = []): boolean {
+  if (!host || allowedHosts === true) { return true }
+  const hostname = parseHostname(host)
+  if (!hostname) { return false }
+  if (hostname === 'localhost' || hostname.endsWith('.localhost') || isIP(hostname)) { return true }
+  for (const entry of allowedHosts) {
+    const allowed = entry.toLowerCase()
+    if (allowed === hostname) { return true }
+    if (allowed.startsWith('.') && (hostname === allowed.slice(1) || hostname.endsWith(allowed))) { return true }
+  }
+  return false
+}
+
+export function isSameOriginRequest (req: DevRequest, allowedHosts?: readonly string[] | true): boolean {
+  const host = firstHeader(req.headers.host)
+  if (!isAllowedHost(host, allowedHosts)) {
+    return false
+  }
+
   const site = firstHeader(req.headers['sec-fetch-site'])
   if (site !== undefined) {
     return site === 'same-origin' || site === 'none'
@@ -25,11 +56,11 @@ export function isSameOriginRequest (req: { headers: Record<string, string | str
     // headers absent if the attacker page is on a non-trustworthy origin
     // (drops `Sec-Fetch-*`), uses a non-CORS `<script>` (no `Origin`), and sets
     // `Referrer-Policy: no-referrer` (drops `Referer`).
-    return isLoopbackHost(firstHeader(req.headers.host))
+    return isLoopbackHost(host)
   }

   try {
-    return new URL(initiator).host === firstHeader(req.headers.host)
+    return new URL(initiator).host === host
   } catch {
     return false
   }

Commit: 3e1c796

Introduced the devServer.allowedHosts configuration schema in @nuxt/schema and passed it down through the Nitro and bundler layers.

Commit: 3c96453

Enforced that Webpack hot middleware is skipped and returns HTTP 403 for forbidden dev requests.

Commit: 8c11d96

Ensured that hosts permitted by the CLI after initial config loading are aggregated dynamically.

Mitigation Strategies

  • Upgrade Nuxt, @nuxt/webpack-builder, and @nuxt/rspack-builder to version 4.6.4 or later to enforce strict Host header allowlist validation.
  • Migrate from @nuxt/webpack-builder or @nuxt/rspack-builder to the default @nuxt/vite-builder where project compatibility permits.
  • Configure explicit hostname allowlists via devServer.allowedHosts in nuxt.config.ts rather than disabling host validation with allowedHosts: true.
  • Use modern browsers that enforce Local Network Access (LNA) / Private Network Access (PNA) restrictions to block public domains from silently connecting to 127.0.0.1.

Remediation Steps:

  1. Inspect package.json and nuxt.config.ts to determine if @nuxt/webpack-builder or @nuxt/rspack-builder is in use.
  2. Run npm install nuxt@^4.6.4 (or the equivalent pnpm/yarn command) to update Nuxt and its builder packages to 4.6.4+.
  3. If using custom development hostnames or reverse proxies, add the specific domain names to devServer.allowedHosts in nuxt.config.ts.
  4. Verify the fix by sending a curl request with an arbitrary Host header (curl -i -H 'Host: evil.example.com' -H 'Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin' http://127.0.0.1:3000/_nuxt/) and confirming the server returns HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden.

References

Read the full report for CVE-2026-128072 on our website for more details including interactive diagrams and full exploit analysis.

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