CVE-2026-128071: CVE-2026-128071: Route-Rule Authorization Bypass via Encoded Slashes in Nuxt
CVE-2026-128071: Route-Rule Authorization Bypass via Encoded Slashes in Nuxt Vulnerability ID: CVE-2026-128071 CVSS Score: 6.5 Published: 2026-11-16 CVE-2026-128071 is a route-rule authorization bypass and security
CVE-2026-128071: Route-Rule Authorization Bypass via Encoded Slashes in Nuxt
Vulnerability ID: CVE-2026-128071
CVSS Score: 6.5
Published: 2026-11-16
CVE-2026-128071 is a route-rule authorization bypass and security policy circumvention vulnerability in the Nuxt web framework, affecting nuxt, @nuxt/nitro-server, and @nuxt/vite-server prior to version 4.6.4. Serving as an incomplete fix for GHSA-6gq8-jgmh-3ffp, the flaw arises from an interpretation conflict between Nuxt's route-rule matching logic and Vue Router's catch-all route parameter decoding. When processing an incoming HTTP request containing percent-encoded forward slashes (%2F or %2f), the route-rule evaluation engine preserves the encoded sequence as a single path segment, failing to match prefix-based rules such as /admin/**. However, when the request is subsequently dispatched to a catch-all page route (app/pages/[...slug].vue) or a multi-segment parameter handler, the parameters are URL-decoded into literal slash delimiters. This discrepancy allows unauthenticated remote attackers to bypass route-level redirects, authentication middleware (appMiddleware), security headers, proxy configurations, and rendering constraints (ssr: false, noScripts), while the catch-all page resolves and renders the protected resource.
TL;DR
An interpretation conflict between Nuxt's route-rule matcher and catch-all page routing allows unauthenticated attackers to bypass path-based security rules (routeRules) by substituting literal forward slashes (/) with URL-encoded slashes (%2F) in HTTP request paths. Upgrading to Nuxt 4.6.4 resolves the issue.
⚠️ Exploit Status: POC
Technical Details
- Vulnerability ID: CVE-2026-128071 / GHSA-f3x9-2chm-73c8
- Weakness Class: CWE-436 (Interpretation Conflict) / CWE-863 (Incorrect Authorization)
- Attack Vector: Network (HTTP/HTTPS request with %2F in URL path)
- CVSS v3.1 Score: 6.5 Medium (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N)
- EPSS Score: 0.27% (19.12th Percentile)
- Security Impact: Bypass of routeRules (redirects, appMiddleware, headers, SSR/noScripts rules) on catch-all routes
- Exploit Status: Proof-of-Concept in upstream unit tests
- Patched Version: Nuxt 4.6.4
Affected Systems
- nuxt
- @nuxt/nitro-server
- @nuxt/vite-server
-
nuxt: >= 3.0.0, < 4.6.4 (Fixed in:
4.6.4) -
@nuxt/nitro-server: >= 3.20.0, < 4.0.0 and >= 4.2.0, < 4.6.4 (Fixed in:
4.6.4) -
@nuxt/vite-server: >= 4.6.0, < 4.6.4 (Fixed in:
4.6.4)
Code Analysis
Commit: 084396b
fix(nitro,nuxt): match route rules for paths with encoded slashes
--- a/packages/nitro-server/src/runtime/utils/route-rules.ts
+++ b/packages/nitro-server/src/runtime/utils/route-rules.ts
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ import { createRouter, toRouteMatcher } from 'radix3'
import type { RouteMatcher } from 'radix3'
import { withoutBase } from 'ufo'
-import { normalizeRouteRulePath } from '#internal/nuxt/route-rules.mjs'
+import { matchAllRouteRules, normalizeRouteRulePath } from '#internal/nuxt/route-rules.mjs'
let matcher: RouteMatcher | undefined
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ function getMatcher (): RouteMatcher {
* and case-folded unless routing is `sensitive`.
*/
export function matchRouteRules (path: string): NitroRouteRules {
- return defu({}, ...getMatcher().matchAll(normalizeRouteRulePath(path)).reverse()) as NitroRouteRules
+ return defu({}, ...matchAllRouteRules(path => getMatcher().matchAll(normalizeRouteRulePath(path)), path).reverse()) as NitroRouteRules
}
--- a/packages/nuxt/src/core/utils/route-rules.ts
+++ b/packages/nuxt/src/core/utils/route-rules.ts
@@ -237,7 +237,7 @@ export function resolveRouteRules<T extends Record<string, any>> (router: RouteRulesRouter, path: string, fold: boolean): T {
- return defu({} as T, ...router.matchAll('', normalizeRouteRulePath(path, fold)).reverse())
+ return defu({} as T, ...matchAllRouteRules(path => router.matchAll('', normalizeRouteRulePath(path, fold)), path).reverse())
}
Exploit Details
- GitHub: Official upstream fix commit containing Vitest unit test cases demonstrating route-rule bypass payloads using %2F and ..%2F sequences.
Mitigation Strategies
- Upgrade Nuxt and its associated server packages (@nuxt/nitro-server, @nuxt/vite-server) to patched version 4.6.4 or later.
- Configure reverse proxies or Web Application Firewalls (WAF) to reject HTTP requests containing percent-encoded forward slashes (%2F or %2f) in the URL pathname.
- Enforce authentication and authorization checks directly inside catch-all page components via definePageMeta or global middleware inspecting decoded route.params rather than relying solely on prefix-based routeRules.
- Validate catch-all array parameters (route.params.slug) to reject individual segment items that contain decoded slash characters ('/').
Remediation Steps:
- Update package.json to require nuxt >= 4.6.4.
- Run your package manager's update command (e.g., npm install [email protected] or pnpm update [email protected]) and verify in the lockfile that @nuxt/nitro-server and @nuxt/vite-server are updated to 4.6.4.
- Rebuild and redeploy the Nuxt application so both compiled server runtime matchers and client-side route-rule templates include the matchAllRouteRules fix.
- Verify the remediation by sending test requests with %2F in protected paths (e.g., curl -i https://example.com/admin%2Ftest) and confirming that configured redirects, middleware, and headers are enforced.
References
- GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-f3x9-2chm-73c8
- Nuxt Patch Commit 084396b101e3b4d3545e86ff80dc313496bc87c0
- Nuxt v4.6.4 Release Notes
- NVD - CVE-2026-128071
- CVE.org Record - CVE-2026-128071
- CVEListV5 JSON Record - CVE-2026-128071
- Wiz Vulnerability Database - CVE-2026-128071
Read the full report for CVE-2026-128071 on our website for more details including interactive diagrams and full exploit analysis.
Originally published by Dev.to Security. Aggregated on AIWithGhost for educational purposes — full credit and traffic to the original publisher.