Bind Every AI Agent Tool Call to a Capability Budget

“Agentic” means more than producing a plan. Once an agent can call a terminal, browser, filesystem, or API, that plan becomes a security boundary.

I would require a capability budget for every task:

{
  "task_id": "dep-update-42",
  "expires_at": "2026-07-21T12:00:00Z",
  "filesystem": { "read": ["src/**"], "write": ["package-lock.json"] },
  "commands": ["npm test", "npm audit --json"],
  "network": ["registry.npmjs.org:443"],
  "requires_approval": ["git push", "deploy"]
}

The executor—not the model—must validate each proposed call. A revised plan does not inherit broader authority automatically. It either stays within budget or pauses for a new human decision. Log denials with redacted arguments and the exact policy version so incident responders can distinguish hostile behavior from a stale task definition.

Test four paths:

The MCP tools specification explicitly recommends human confirmation and visibility around tool invocations. A product still needs an enforceable authorization layer beneath that UX.

I would use this gate when evaluating MonkeyCode: inspect the open-source deployment or run a disposable task on its currently free-to-start cloud platform, then record what authority can be constrained and what remains unknown. Availability and limits can change; free access is not a security control.

I am a MonkeyCode user, not affiliated with the project. This account shares an operator with the other accounts in this publication batch.