Bazuka Android Malware Uses Fake Screen Overlays to Hide Credential Theft and Device Control
Cybersecurity researchers have disclosed details of a previously unknown Android malware framework called Bazuka that offers large language model (LLM) integration for victim management and control at scale. Dutch mobil
Bazuka Android Malware Uses Fake Screen Overlays to Hide Credential Theft and Device Control
Cybersecurity researchers have disclosed details of a previously unknown Android malware framework called Bazuka that offers large language model (LLM) integration for victim management and control at scale.
Dutch mobile security company ThreatFabric said it discovered the threat in late October 2026 during an investigation into an NFC-relay banking Trojan.
"Bazuka is a full malware framework," ThreatFabric said in a technical report. "A dropper/downloader, a core, and 23 modules cover overlays, keylogging, 2FA and SMS interception, remote control, and crypto-address swapping."
One notable aspect of the malware that distinguishes it from the rest is a novel overlay technique that allows the trojan to take a screenshot of the home screen or lock screen, and display that as an overlay on demand to cover up malicious activities taking place in the background.
Another perhaps not-so-surprising element is the use of artificial intelligence (AI) in the control panel to help operators identify victims of interest and manage infections. It supports both locally hosted models and models accessed through an API.
One of the sample prompts provided by the author refers to a score, indicating an operator can likely request the AI model to score victims and determine how attractive they are as targets. The panel also supports the following capabilities -
- Create accounts for traffers, who are cybercriminals responsible for driving victims to malware using various lures
- Build droppers containing the malware with options to choose the kind of permissions specified in the Android manifest file likely in an attempt to bypass Google Play app review process
This indicates that the dropper apps can be distributed via at least two distribution channels: through traffers, who can use social media ads or bogus sites to trick users into downloading them, and Google Play Store.
One of the droppers containing the malware masquerades as a premium, adult-friendly version of TikTok (package name: "com.tiktok.premium"). Two different variants of the Bazuka attack chain have been observed -
- A dropper, which asks the victim for permissions to install applications from third-party sources and then proceeds to download a standalone APK ("com.tiktok.premium.pro") that serves as the stager
- A downloader that directly downloads the main payload
It's suspected that the stager is the same as the downloader, whose main responsibility is to retrieve the core and supplementary modules necessary for a particular campaign, and then launch them.
"Once the core and required modules are loaded, Bazuka operates as a keylogger and a classic overlay trojan, monitoring the text entered by the victim and displaying an overlay at the right moment," ThreatFabric said. "All functionality is controlled by commands from C2 [command-and-control]."
The core module is the orchestrator, maintaining communication with C2, loading additional DEX modules, dispatching commands, collecting device information, and managing permissions and component updates. Like other Android trojans, it abuses Android Debug Bridge (ADB) shell commands and the operating system's accessibility services to request permissions and grant them automatically.
"Important components of the core include mechanisms for enabling Wireless Debugging and completing the pairing process," ThreatFabric explained. "The core can open the system settings screen, find the relevant menu, enable Developer options, and then enable Wireless Debugging."
"When this mode is enabled, it also intercepts the PIN, which is then used to establish a TLS connection to the ADB daemon."
Furthermore, the core component counters detection by Google Play by disabling the protection component through the accessibility services API. It is also equipped to launch a self-destruct mechanism that clears local storage, deletes the database, and disables the application completely.
Communication with the C2 server takes place over two WebSocket channels -
- Control, which is used to issue commands
- Data, which is used to exfiltrate data and screen capture streams
Bazuka supports 23 modules that enable comprehensive data and cryptocurrency theft -
- call_forwarding, to manage call forwarding through USSD commands
- clip_monitor, to act as a clipper and substitute cryptocurrency wallet addresses copied to the clipboard with attacker-controlled ones
- contacts, to collect contact information
- device_control, to manage the device over the ADB bridge and execute commands as shell commands
- file_manager, to access the file system
- input_recorder, to act as a keylogger and capture all text entered into a target application, as well as identify bank card numbers, wallet addresses, and passwords in user input
- location, to determine a victim's location using GPS, cell tower positioning, and Wi-Fi
- media, to capture photos and stream camera video and microphone audio
- oem_power, to open system and OEM settings for power saving, background operation, and autostart
- optics, to facilitate remote control, screencasting, and phishing overlays
- preflight, to perform preliminary checks of the runtime environment
- proxy, to implement a reverse TCP proxy
- push, to create and manage local Android notifications
- screen_control, to capture the lock screen PIN, text password, and unlock pattern through accessibility services
- self_adb, to implement an embedded ADB client
- session_ui, to display phishing HTML overlays
- smsmessage, to access SMS messages and extract potential verification codes, send SMS messages, and attempt to delete messages from the device
- system_checker, to check the runtime environment and implement anti-analysis measures
- tapread-nfc_module, to interact with contactless bank cards
- toast, to display text messages on the device's screen
- twofa, to capture one-time verification codes
- uninstall_shield, to counter attempts to uninstall or force-stop the application
- ussd, to send USSD requests from the victim's device and receive responses from the mobile operator
The malware has not been attributed to any known threat actor or group. However, the panel has been found to display UI elements in a mix of English and Russian.
"ADB bridging is becoming a standard feature of modern banking trojans," ThreatFabric said. "While it is not there yet for Bazuka and its current architecture, this is a very concerning sign, as it allows malware to obtain various privileges covertly and deploy independent modules that can survive removal of the host application."
"Another equally concerning feature is the use of LLM chats directly within the control panel. AI agents are used to identify victims of interest."
ArcticRAT Android Malware Uses LLMs to Extract High-Value Data
Bazuka is not the only Android-focused threat to integrate LLM. Last week, Zimperium zLabs research team detailed another sophisticated and rapidly evolving Android malware called ArcticRAT that supports 129 distinct commands and incorporates LLM APIs into its data exfiltration pipeline to extract high-value financial intelligence from stolen SMS messages and app data.
"What initially began as a targeted spyware operation aimed at users of 11 specific cryptocurrency apps has morphed into an enterprise grade, AI-powered, Remote Access Trojan (RAT)," researchers Rajat Goyal and Fernando Ortega said.
Infection chains make use of malicious sites impersonating Google Play app listings to convince users to install the dropper app. Unsuspecting users are redirected to these pages through malvertising, smishing, or third-party forums. The apps masquerade as popular brands (e.g., Amazon and TikTok), cryptocurrency applications, and generic file managers.
Once installed, the app abuses Android accessibility services to establish remote control, automate fraudulent activity, and leverage AI to parse and "clean" exfiltrated data. It uses TCP sockets to communicate with the C2 infrastructure.
An initial reconnaissance step is used to build a host profile, which then dictates the C2 server to dynamically select the relevant attack payloads to deploy. At a high level, the malware supports the following features -
- Initiate a real-time video transmission from the compromised device
- Abuse accessibility services for full remote control
- Serve fake extortion overlays and deceive victims into making cryptocurrency payments
- Make use of LLMs to process harvested SMS messages and look for financial, banking, and trading apps through hard-coded prompts that ask the model to take the role of a professional SMS analyzer and device app analyzer, respectively
- Capture credentials, authentication codes, and private communications
- Serve overlays to steal device lock screen pattern, PIN, or password
"The malware requests VPN service privileges to null-route network communication on the victim's device, effectively blinding Google Play Protect telemetry during the staging phase," Zimperium said.
"To prevent the user from interfering with these operations, ArcticRAT employs a defense evasion tactic known as a "Black Screen" overlay. When the attacker is navigating banking apps via Hidden VNC (HVNC) or auto-approving system permissions, the malware draws a completely black, un-dismissible view over the screen and drops the brightness to zero. To the victim, the device appears locked or powered off."
Recent versions of ArcticRAT have also been found to abuse the native Wireless Debugging mechanism to initiate a privileged shell session on the victim machine and execute commands, including enabling or disabling accessibility permissions, verifying lock screen PIN or pattern, and displaying a black screen to conceal background operations.
"By abandoning hardcoded attacks in favor of real-time Hidden VNC (HVNC), raw TCP command-and-control (C2), and aggressive defense evasion overlays, the malware achieves complete device takeover," Zimperium said.
Originally published by The Hacker News. Aggregated on AIWithGhost for educational purposes — full credit and traffic to the original publisher.