68.5% of .lt domains have no DMARC record: what a scan of 64,910 domains shows
I run a small website security service in Lithuania. In November I checked the mail records of every .lt domain I could find, 64,910 of them, and published the result as an open dataset. This post is about one column of
I run a small website security service in Lithuania. In November I checked the mail records of every .lt domain I could find, 64,910 of them, and published the result as an open dataset. This post is about one column of it: the DMARC policy.
The numbers
| DMARC policy | Domains | Share |
|---|---|---|
| No record at all | 44,466 | 68.5% |
p=none (monitoring only) |
16,412 | 25.3% |
p=quarantine |
2,440 | 3.8% |
p=reject |
1,588 | 2.4% |
SPF looks much better: 86.6% of the same domains publish an SPF record.
So the typical Lithuanian domain says which servers may send its mail, and then says nothing about what a receiver should do when a message fails that check. Only 6.2% of domains ask receivers to act on a failure.
Why the gap between SPF and DMARC
Three explanations fit what the table shows. They are my reading, not something the data proves.
SPF arrives by default. Many hosting control panels create an SPF record when the domain is added. Nobody decides to publish it. DMARC is almost never created for you, so somebody has to know it exists.
p=none is where people stop. A quarter of all domains have a DMARC record that only monitors. That is the right first step, because it lets you collect reports before you start rejecting mail. But if nobody reads the reports, the second step never happens, and a p=none record that stays forever protects nothing.
Small senders feel no pressure. Since February 2024 Gmail and Yahoo require a DMARC record from anyone who sends more than 5,000 messages a day to their users. A company that sends forty invoices a month is far below that line, and its mail keeps arriving, so the record stays missing.
What "no DMARC" means in practice
It does not mean the domain is hacked or that its mail is insecure in transit. It means that anyone can put [email protected] in the From line, and the receiving server has no instruction from the domain owner to treat the message as forged.
The fraud this enables is rarely clever: an invoice with a changed bank account number, sent "from" a supplier the victim already trusts. The supplier's own systems are never touched.
What the data does not show
A few limits, so the numbers are not stretched further than they go:
- Only registered domains are counted, not subdomains.
- A domain with no DMARC record may send no mail at all. It can still be impersonated, but the owner may reasonably not care.
- DKIM is not in the table. A selector name cannot be discovered from outside, so any DKIM figure from a scan like this would be a guess.
- The domain list comes from Common Crawl, not from the registry zone file. It leans towards domains that are linked from somewhere.
- Nothing was sent. These are DNS lookups only.
If you have a domain without one
Start with monitoring and an address you actually read:
_dmarc.example.com. TXT "v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:[email protected]"
Read the reports for a few weeks. Find every service that sends mail in your name (the shop, the newsletter tool, the accounting system) and make sure each one passes SPF or DKIM with your domain. Then move to p=quarantine, and later to p=reject.
The part people skip is the calendar entry that says "raise the policy". Without it you join the 25%.
The data
The table above, with the method, is here: How many .lt domains publish DMARC and SPF records?
The whole dataset covers 125,935 .lt hostnames: platforms, WordPress and PHP versions, exposed files, mail records. It is anonymised (no domain names or IP addresses) and published under CC BY 4.0 on Zenodo and GitHub.
I would like to compare this with other country domains. If you have run the same check on .lv, .ee, .pl or anything else, tell me what you saw.
Originally published by Dev.to Security. Aggregated on AIWithGhost for educational purposes — full credit and traffic to the original publisher.